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Some Thoughts About the Role of




HE TAKEOVER MOVEMENT is now largely moribund be-
cause of tight money, a change of attitude by the Antitrust
Division about the standards for gauging the legality of pure con-
glomerate acquisitions,' a decline in performance by some of the con-
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Exchange Act of 1934 concerning
glomerates,2 changes in the tax
law discouraging the offeror's
use of its debt securities in ac-
quisitions,3 the proposed re-
strictions upon the use of the
pooling of interests method of
accounting for combinations,"
and some uncertainty in the
case law under the Securities
the disclosures which must be
made.- To be added to that enumeration are the state laws govern-
ing takeover bids,6 the most direct and far-reaching recent legisla-
* I want to express my deep gratitude to Mr. David E. Jones, a December 1969 grad-
uate of the College of Law, Ohio State University, for his excellent work in conduct-
ing a substantial portion of the research for this artide.
I See Dam, Corporate Takeovers and the Antitrust Laws, 25 Bus. LAW. 735 (1970);
Ling, The Conglomerate and Antitrust, 25 Bus. LAW. 571 (1970); Reichley, Elm
Street's New White House Power, FORTUNE, Dec. 1969, at 71, 122, 125; Comment,
Conglomerates and Section 7: Is Size Enough?, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 337 (1970).
2 For interesting reports on Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., see McDonald, Some Candid
Answers From James J. Ling, FORTUNE, Aug. 1969, at 92; id. Sept. 1969, at 136; Wall
Street Journal, Mar. 12, 1970, at 2, col. 2; id. Mar. 9, 1970, at 28, col. 1.
3 For an analysis, see Tiger, New Law's "Anti-Conglomerate" Provisions Can Be Ac-
commodated With Proper Planning, 32 J. TAXATION 130 (1970).
4 Concerning the proposed xestrictions, see Wall Street Journal, Mar. 2, 1970, at 7,
col. 2 (Midwest ed.); id. Dec. 3, 1969, at 38, col. 7; id. Oct. 31, 1969, at 22, col. 5.
Compare the initial decision of the SEC Hearing Examiner in In re Susquehanna
Corp., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 77,741, at 83,692 (SEC Hearing Ex-
aminer Aug. 5, 1969), with Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., [Current
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,610, at 98,749 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1970).
61 have not attempted a search, but the following are those enacted takeover statutes
of general application to all business corporations which have come to my attention:
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tion, state or federal, affecting takeovers. They were enacted after
it became evident that the mild Williams Bill,' passed in 1968 as an
amendment to the Exchange Act, had not changed the ground rules
much.
So far, these state statutes have appeared in two general forms.
The insurance company takeover statutes erect formidable barriers
on three regulatory bases: shareholder protection, effect on com-
petition, and policyholder protection.8  These statutes are licens-
ing measures for prospective controlling stockholders. The statute
with which we are concerned, the Ohio Takeover Act,9 passed in
July 1969, belongs in the second category, for it is a securities reg-
ulation and general corporations law dealing only with the offeror's
disclosures and the substantive fairness of its offer to the target's
securityholders.
The Ohio Takeover Act (the Act) sets standards which must be
met in a takeover bid for equity securities of an Ohio corporation or
a corporation which has its principal place of business plus substan-
tial property in the state (an Ohio-based corporation).1o The Act's
requirements apply globally, including, say, a bid made in New
York by and to persons residing there if the target corporation has
the requisite Ohio connection. 1 In numerous ways, the Ohio Act
presses beyond the federal statutes, especially in its requirements
that cash and securities tender offers be precleared by the Division
of Securities (which may order a hearing) during a waiting period
after public filing of the proposed offering materials and that both
types of offers meet requirements of substantive fairness, as well as
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as CODE];
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528-40 (Supp. 1968). For discussion of these statutes, see, re-
spectively, Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill, 43 OHIo BAR 65 (Jan. 19, 1970); Comment,
Take-Over Bids In Virginia, 26 WASI. & LEE L REV. 323 (1969). Insurance company
takeover statutes include: CAL. INS. CODE § 1215.2 (West Supp. 1969); Conn. Pub. Act
No. 444 (Jan. Sess. 1969); MD. CODE ANN., art. 48A, §§ 491-503 (Supp. 1969); Pa.
Act No. 337 (Reg. Sess. 1968).
The Virginia statute, supra, was amended in April 1970 to incorporate many of the
central features of the Ohio legislation, supra. See 3 CCH BLUE SKY 1. REP. 55 49,
228-41.
7 The Bill added sections 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f)
(Supp. IV, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
8 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1215.2 (West Supp. 1969); Conn. Pub. Act No. 444
(Jan. Sess. 1969); MD. CODE ANN., art. 48A, §§ 491-503 (Supp. 1969); Pa. Act No.
337 (Reg. Sess. 1968).
) Amend. Sub. S.B. No. 138, File No. 90 (Reg. Sess. 1969-70), codified in CODE §§
1707.041(A) - (I) (Page Supp. 1969).
10 See text accompanying notes 153-65 infra,
See text accompanying notes 38-40, 82-83, 86-91 infra.
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searching disclosure standards of the type imposed by the Securities
Act of 1933.1 The Act, which may become a protoype, is super-
added to the federal statutes and the blue sky laws of the various states
in which the offer is made.Y3
My inquiry is a rather narrow one of federalism directed to the
proper allocation of legislative jurisdiction to regulate takeover bids
among the state of incorporation (and the state in which the
corporation is based), the states in which the bid is made, and the
federal government. Specifically, the inquiry is whether Ohio's as-
sertion of jurisdiction is proper in the American scheme of securi-
ties regulation and corporations law. My general answers are that
a takeover bid by a prospective major or controlling stockholder is
in essence an internal affairs transaction which a state having leg-
islative jurisdiction over the corporation's internal affairs may rea-
sonably regulate; that the Act is not an unreasonable exercise of
legislative jurisdiction; that, however, courts in other states may
refuse to apply the Act to transactions outside Ohio; and, that al-
though the Act has almost unique interstate impact, it is an inter-
esting and useful experiment and consideration of exclusive federal
regulation of takeovers is definitely premature at the present time.
I believe, however, that in several respects the Act's existing struc-
ture is inconsistent with its stated purpose of providing fair, full,
and effective disclosure to securityholders. A number of amend-
ments are suggested.
A word is in order about the scope of the article. First, the
article assumes a familiarity by the reader with the structure and ef-
fects of the federal regulation of takeover bids and proxy fights
(a related form of battle between management and insurgents),
subjects covered in several outstanding works. 14
Secondly, I do not attempt to re-present the arguments on the
social value of takeovers or any particular form of securities or
corporation law regulation of takeovers. The literature on these
broader issues is excellent.' 5 At the risk of emphasizing the ob-
1' Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1964) [hereinafter cited as Securities
Act]. See text accompanying notes 43-94 infra.
Is On the use of portions of the Act by Virginia, see note 6 supra. Concerning the
superaddition, see text accompanying notes 139-47 infra.
14 See A. BROMBERG, SEcrmTIES LAWS: FRAUD - SEC RULE lob-5, §§ 6.1-.6
(1969); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 857-1036 (2d ed. 1961); 5 id. 2829-2999
(Supp. 1969); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 317 (1967); Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation,
15 N.Y.L.F. 269 (1969); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L REV. 377 (1969).
15 See 6 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 3664-66 (Supp. 1969). See generally Cohen,
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vious, however, I will note a central fact: The broader effects of
securityholder protection are dramatically pronounced in takeover
legislation. Takeover legislation may be framed in terms of in-
vestor protection standards, which is true of the Act and the Wil-
liams Bill, and does increase the information available to security-
holders. One almost inevitable effect of such legislation, is,
however, to increase management's tenure protections."8 Oppo-
nents of takeover legislation deplore the anti-Darwinism. They
also point out that investors may lose when takeover bids are regu-
lated, even by benign means such as disclosure. The takeover bid
represents a means of disposition alternative to the market and
usually at a higher price. To the takeover bidder, any regula-
tion of his bid discourages, and the benefit to securityholders of
even the mild regulation established by the Williams Bill may be
outweighed by the value of takeover bids that may never be con-
ceived or completed because of such regulation.
Lastly, my coverage is almost entirely limited to the Act, since
it is the most comprehensive state statute regulating takeovers of
all types of business corporations. The insurance company take-
over statutes are not considered to any appreciable extent. Al-
though these statutes demand considerably more of a takeover of-
feror than does the Act, they rely upon policyholder protection and
effects upon competition in addition to securityholder protection
as bases of legislative jurisdiction. The insurance company statutes
thus have grounds for legitimacy beyond those possessed by statutes
such as the Act, whose sole stated purpose is securityholder pro-
tection.17  General takeover legislation such as the Act presents the
most difficult and interesting corporations law and securities reg-
ulation problems.
A Note On Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAw. 149 (1966);
Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 14; Hamilton, supra note 14; Manne, Cash Tender
Offers For Shares - A Reply To Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuKE L.J. 232; Vorys, supra
note 6.
18 See authorities cited note 15 supra.
1 7 The purpose clause, which is not included in the Code, states the following aim:
":Tio protect shareholders of Ohio and Ohio-based corporations by requiring public
announcement and fair, full, and effective disclosure to shareholders in regard to take-
over bids." Amend. Sub. S.B. No. 138, File No. 90, at I (Reg. Sess. 1969-70).
The insurance company takeover statutes [see note 6 supra) regulate takeovers under
standards of policyholder protection, effect on competition, and securityholder protec-
tion. They also undertake to regulate transactions between insurance companies and
persons controlling them (and their affiliates). Most of the regulation in such statutes
probably relates to the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964). See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393
U.S. 453, 457-64 (1969). Federal securities regulation of insurance company takeovers,
however, is probably not displaced. See id. at 461.
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Because the Act is new and highly controversial and because we
are considering the legitimacy of the Act in our scheme of federal-
ism, I have thought it wise to begin with an analysis of what the
Act does and does not require, especially in comparison with the
central requirements of the Williams Bill and the Securities Act.
II. COMPAlUSON OF THE AcT WITH
THE FEDERAL REGULATION
The Act mixes custom-made solutions with language and con-
cepts from the Williams Bill and the SEC's regulations, the Securi-
ties Act, and preexisting sections of the Ohio Securities Law (of
which the Act is a part). Because of the mixed ancestry and the
not-so-tranquil circumstances in which the Act was passed, inter-
pretation of parts of the Act is uncertain. Arthur Vorys, Esq., a
proponent of the Act, has described the heated battle between such
powerful groups as the Ohio Manufacturers Association (pro)
and the Investment Bankers Association of America (con)."' He
notes a total of 13 legislative committee hearings and "innumer-
able amendments."' 1 Mr. Vorys summarizes the result: "As with
so many statutes which survive a hot legislative struggle, this one
has been molded by numerous sculptors and therefore occasionally
loses its symmetry. Nevertheless, its basic form is perfectly under-
standable and reasonably aesthetic." 20
The Act's general approach - that of imposing demanding
requirements upon takeover offerors while leaving management un-
touched - is of course explained by the fact that corporate man-
agements supplied the impetus for adoption. The takeover move-
ment achieved its greatest momentum in late 1968 and early 1969,
as takeover offerors realized that the enactment of the Williams
Bill the previous summer had only barely changed the rules. Take-
over attempts became bolder and larger targets were selected. Few
executive suites were free of anxiety. AS a result, however, take-
over defenses improved in sophistication and effectiveness. For
example, B. F. Goodrich, an Ohio-based corporation, showed a full
measure of resourcefulness and tenacity in blocking the takeover
attempted during the first half of 1969 by Northwest Industries.2'
18 Vorys, supra note 6, at 66.
19 Id.
201 d. at 70.
2 1 For an account of the fight, see O'Hanlon, Goodrich's Four-Ply Defense, FoR-
TUNE, July 1969, at 110.
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The Act is a result of the sharpened awareness by corporate man-
agements of the dangers of takeovers to them and of an increased
sophistication about takeover defenses.
A. Takeover Bids and Offerors Covered by the Act
Under the Act, only the "offerors" in a "takeover bid" are
regulated. A takeover bid is defined as a "tender offer" for equity
securities of an Ohio or Ohio-based corporation if after acquisition
the offeror would be the direct or indirect record or beneficial
owner of more than 10 percent of the outstanding equity securities
of any class.2 This is similar to the Williams Bill coverage, except
that the Williams Bill's restriction to equity securities registered
under section 12 of the Exchange Act and equity securities of regis-
tered dosed-end investment companies is missing. 3 The Act thus
reaches companies too small or closely held to be covered under
-the Williams Bill.2' The Act, however, is limited to Ohio and
Ohio-based companies.25  A takeover bid for securities of any other
company, even when made by an Ohio resident or corporation or
made in Ohio, is outside the Act, although preexisting provisions
of the Ohio Securities Law continue to apply to the portion of any
bid made in Ohio. 6
Under the federal structure there is a sharp distinction between
the regulatory treatment of cash and securities bids, governed by
the Williams Bill and the Securities Act, respectively. 7 Probably
the most important feature of the Act is that it treats securities
bids and cash bids the same.28
Neither the Act nor the Ohio Securities Law applies when the
insurgent moves by a proxy solicitation rather than a tender offer.
Although neither the Act nor the Williams Bill defines "tender
offer," the Act translates the "public offer" connotation of the
term into specifics by excluding cash bids to 50 or fewer persons
and securities bids not involving a public offering under the Securi-
ties Act, provided in each case the bid is for the offeror's sole ac-
22 CODE § 1707.041(A) (1) (Page Supp. 1969).
2 3 The Williams Bill's restriction is found in Exchange Act § 14(d) (1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d) (1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
24 See, however, text accompanying note 29 infra.
25 CODE § 1707.041(A) (1) (Page Supp. 1969).
26 Id. § 1707.041(G).
27 See text accompanying notes 46-48, 56, 63-67 intra.
2 8 The Division could require fewer disclosures in a cash bid. See text accompanying
notes 57-67 infra.
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:722
count, is in good faith, and is not for the purpose of avoiding the
Act.2
A dealer's bids for his own account in the ordinary course of
business are excluded.30  Acquisitions through ordinary trading
market transactions seemingly do not constitute a takeover bid,
although as under the Williams Bill a rapid accumulation of rela-
tively large amounts would probably constitute a bid."'
Compliance with the Exchange Act or the Securities Act at the
federal level furnishes no exemption, but several types of trans-
actions subject to the approval of the federal agencies having jur-
29 CODE §§ 1707.041(A)(1)(b)-(c) (Page Supp. 1969).
301d. § 1707.041(A)(1)(a).
3 1 See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 6.3 (327).
By going into the trading markets, the offeror is losing the exemption for cash of-
fers to 50 or fewer persons (see text accompanying note 29 supra) in the same manner
that one selling securities loses the private offering exemption under the Securities
Act by selling through the organized markets. See Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. §
77d(2) (1964); SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), in 1 CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 2776, at 2684-85. In each case, offers are being made to the public.
But the Act and the Williams Bill seem to exclude certain trading market transactions
because each regulates only "tender offers." The background of the Williams Bill would
indicate that "casual" trading market transactions accomplished through only ordinary
solicitation by broker-dealers of orders to sell and accompanied by ordinary brokerage
payments should not be considered as comprehended in the term "tender offer," for
such transactions have limited impact on the markets and cannot lead to the acquisition
of a significant percentage of the target's securities, except over a long period of time.
The reader will note that I am espousing an application of the type of standards promul-
gated in Rule 154 under the Securities Act for the "brokers' exemption." SEC Securities
Act Rule 154, 17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1969), reprinted in 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REp.
2902, at 2707. Under the Wheat Report scheme, Rule 154 would be carried forward
in revamped form as a part of proposed new Rules 162-64. See SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 4997 (Sept. 15, 1969), reprinted in CCH Special Report No. 272 (Extra Edi-
tion Sept. 6, 1969).
The Williams Bill exempts an acquisition which is a "tender offer" if "the acquisi-
tion.. .together with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same
class during the preceding twelve months, would not exceed 2 percentum of that class."
Exchange Act § 14(d) (8) (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (8) (B) (Supp. IV, 1969). The
Act contains no similar exemption. The presence of this exemption in the Williams Bill
may argue for a construction of that statute not permitting trading market transactions to
come within an implied exclusion. If this exemption in the Williams Bill is relied upon,
"all other acquisitions" must be included. Similar problems of integration exist if one
attempts to rely upon the "nonpublic" exclusion (implied in the Williams Bill and ex-
plicit in the Act) and the "casual" trading market exclusions that seem to be implicit
in the Act and the Williams Bill. That is, acquisition of anything more than an in-
significant percentage of the target's securities in a nonpublic transaction may remove
the rationale for allowing a related acquisition of even a very small percentage of such
securities in casual trading market transactions to qualify for an implied exclusion.
Present Securities Act Rule 154 and proposed Rule 16 2 (a)(4 ) resolve in opposite ways
an analogous integration problem concerning private sales.
For additional requirements of prior disclosure imposed with respect to all acquisi-
tions by a 5-percent holder or a person who becomes one, see subsection (B)(2) of the
Act, CODE § 1707.041(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1969), and text accompanying notes 43-45
infra.
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isdiction over banks, bank holding companies, savings and loan
holding companies, and public utility holding companies and public
utilities (as defined in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935) are excludedV2  Aside from that limited exclusion, how-
ever, an offeror's or target's status as a public utility or any other
type of business affected with a special public interest affords no
exemption and imposes no special standards. The Act is not a
measure licensing prospective controlling shareholders. For ex-
ample, if the offeror or target is an insurance company, the Act
applies as usual, although in that particular case the Superintend-
ent of Insurance, rather than the Division of Securities, administers
the Act.33
An offer by a company for its own securities is outside the Act. 4
There is an exclusion, not found in the Williams Bill or the
Securities Act, for a tender offer if the target's board has recom-
mended acceptance to shareholders and the terms of the offer, in-
duding any special inducements to officers and directors, have been
furnished to shareholders.3 5 Presumably it was thought that the
board of the target, before recommending acceptance, would scru-
tinize the fairness of the offer and the adequacy of the disclosures,
thus supplying an adequate substitute for the Act.
Lastly, the Act empowers the Division to exempt by "reasonable"
regulations takeover bids having neither the purpose nor the effect
of changing or influencing the control of the target.3" The Williams
Bill contains a similar provision3 7
Because of the judicial tendency to employ a territorial canon
of construction in interpreting legislation, 8 it is surprising that the
Act is inexplicit on extraterritorial coverage. Moreover, the Act
is a part of the Ohio Securities Law rather than the General Cor-
porations Law; and the Securities Law, unlike the General Corpora-
tions Law, is limited by its language and by interpretation to acts
in Ohio. 9 However, the seemingly unavoidable implication is that
s2 CODE § 1707.041(H) (Page Supp. 1969).
3314. § 1707.041(G).
34 See id. § 1707.041(A) (1).
351d. § 1707.041(A)(1)(d).
361d. § 1707.041(F)(2).
3 7 Exchange Act § 14(d) (8) (D), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (8) (D) (Supp. IV, 1969).
38 See L. Loss & E. Cow='r, BLUE SKY LAw 211-12 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Loss & COWErr]. See also Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking In Defining The
International Reach Of American Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. LJ. 586, 592
(1961).
S9 See CODE §§ 1707.01(E)(1), .05, .09-.11 (Page 1964); Ohio Division of Securi-
ties, Ruling No. 11, reprinted in 2 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 38,711, at 34,525.
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the Act applies globally - for example, to a New York resident
making a bid there for equity securities of an Ohio corporation.40
The Act's definition of "offerors" regulated seems even broader
than that in the Williams Bill. "Offeror means a person who
makes, or in any way participates or aids in making, a take-over bid,
and includes persons [iJ acting jointly or in concert, or [ii] who
intend to exercise jointly or in concert any voting rights attached
to the securities for which such take-over bid is made."141 Among
those included are members of the dealer group. Thus, an Ohio-
registered broker-dealer jeopardizes his license by participating in a
nonqualifying takeover bid made outside Ohio.4 2
B. How the Offeror Complies with the Act
Chronologically, the first duty is imposed by a Draconian ana-
logue of sections 13(d) and 16(a) of the Exchange Act.43  A
person owning 5 percent or more of any class of the. target's equity
securities may not launch a takeover bid if, within the year before
the bid, he acquired (in any manner) any of the target's equity
securities and failed, before the transaction, publicly to announce
his intention to gain control or to make "fair, full, and effective
disclosure of such intention" to those from whom he purchased.44
The 1-year delay presumably applies whether or not the intent
existed when, say, the first 100 shares were purchased on an ex-
change.4" Although private purchases and ordinary trading market
transactions are spared the Act's full regulatory treatment, this pro-
vision substantially decreases their utility.
The Act eliminates the surprise permitted by the Williams Bill,
which allows the materials to be filed simultaneously with the com-
mencement of the bid.4" In enacting the Williams Bill, Congress
4 0 The Act covers only companies with an Ohio nexus of the type which supports in-
ternal affairs regulation. That regulation is always extraterritorial. See text accom-
panying notes 122-26 infra. Furthermore, the Act does not contain a single limita-
tion to acts "in this state," a phrase liberally employed in the remainder of the Ohio Se-
curities Law [CODE §§ 1707.01 (E) (1), .05, .09-.11 (Page 1964)], and the Act reads
as though it is intended to apply globally. Furthermore, the Act, if interpreted as one
governing only the Ohio portion of a tender offer, is largely superfluous. See text ac-
companying notes 88-91 infra. The canon of territorial construction should easily be
overcome. Cf. Trautman, supra note 38.
4 1 CODE § 1707.041 (A) (2) (Page Supp. 1969).
42 See Vorys, supra note 6, at 69, 71.
4 3 CODE § 1707.041(B) (2) (Page Supp. 1969).
44 Id. There was a grace period for those purchasing before the 30th day following
the effective date.
45 See text accompanying notes 191-93 infra.
4 6 A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 6.3 (421).
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decided against a waiting period after filing and before the bid is
made.47  The Bill does, however, allow tendering shareholders to-
withdraw during the first 7 days of the offer,48 giving manage-
ment a semblance of an opportunity to present its case.
Under the Act, 20 days prior to a takeover bid, the offeror
must publicly announce the terms of the offer 9 and file with the
target and the Division copies of the materials to be" used and the
data and information required by the Act, 0 all of which must
meet the Act's disclosure standards.5' It appears that no solicita-
tion by the offeror is permitted until clearance of the offer and the
disclosure materials.5 On its own motion, or upon management's
request, the Division may during the first 10 days after the filing
order a hearing.53  The Division's conclusion on the necessity for
a hearing appears to be beyond review.54 If no hearing is ordered,
the offeror may proceed at the end of the 20-day period."5
The Act requires, of cash bids and of securities bids, a com-
bination of Williams Bill vand Securities Act disclosures and in a
few particulars goes beyond both. However, the disclosure burdens
imposed upon a securities offeror in addition to those under the
Securities Act (which in nearly all cases-will also be applicable)
are few; and the Securities Act's waiting period after the filing of
the registration statement removes the surprise from a. securities
bid. The main impact of the waiting period, preclearahce, -and dis-
closure requirements of the Act is on cash bids. Of those, bids,
the Act is far more demanding than the federal legislation. The
waiting period under the Act does, however, impose one signifi-
cant burden on securities bids in addition to those present under
the Securities Act. Under the Act, it appears that no solicitation is
permitted until the end of the 20-day period (or until approval, if
a hearing is ordered), whereas the Securities Act allows certain
4
-
7 See id.; Cohen, supra note 15, at 152-53.
4 8 A. BORaoBG, supra note 14, §§ 6.3 (521)-(525).
49 CODE § 1707.041(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1969). No particular form of announce-
ment is specified.
1Old.
51 See text accompanying notes 5 7-73 inira.
52 
"Takeover bid" seems to be defined broadly enough to include any type of solic-
itation of offers to sell CODE § 1707.041(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1969). Subsection
(B) (3) speaks of the filing of all material by which the offeror "proposes" to make full
disclosure. The wording of subsection (C), relating to pro rata takeups, also seems to
support this construction.
531d. § 1707.041(B)(1).
5 See note 80 infra.
55 CODE § 1707.041(B) (1) (Page Supp. 1969).
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types of preliminary solicitation immediately after the filing of the
registration statement.56
The general disclosure standard demands that the offeror "make
fair, full, and effective disclosure to offerees of all informa-
tion material to a decision to accept or reject the offer."15 7  Be-
fore clearance is granted, the Division must conclude that the of-
feror proposes to do this.58 The Act does not specifically state
the items of information to be communicated to securityholders,
the form of prospectus to be used, or the means or timing of its
delivery. The Act, however, enumerates data to be filed with the
Division, and there is an implication that all this information
must be communicated. 59  Furthermore, since the Act emphasizes
"effective" disclosure, the delivery of a full prospectus of the type
required by the Securities Act to each securityholder who deposits is
undoubtedly the contemplated general nile. The more difficult
question is whether this delivery is to be made simultaneously with
the deposit or whether delivery must precede the deposit. The Act
seems to contemplate that less formal and inclusive soliciting docu-
ments may precede the prospectus.60 These are questions within the
Division's reasonable discretion,6 and it can be -anticipated that the
Division will insist upon effective communication of salient facts
through techniques such as clear summaries.62
The specified data to be filed with the Division consists, gener-
ally speaking, of the following: (1) The few items of information
required by the SEC under the Williams Bill, with some changes.6"
For example, the Williams Bill's requirement concerning borrowed
funds is omitted and the Act's requirements concerning plans or
proposals for changes in the target's operations includes "policies of
56 See 1 L. Loss, rupra note 14, at 223-45; 4 id. 2320-25 (Supp. 1969); SEC Securi-
ties Act Release Nos. 5009-10 (Oct. 10, 1969), in [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L
REP. 55 77,743-44, at 83,702-07 (1969).
57 CODE §§ 1707.041(B)(1) (c), (B)(3)(h), (B)(4) (Page Supp. 1969).
58 The subsections which expressly impose the standard when a hearing is ordered
lid.] would seem to make it incumbent upon the Division so to conclude before it decides
under subsection (B)(1)(a) or (B)(1)(b) that no hearing is necessary. Id. §§ 1707.041(B)(1)(a)-(b.
59 See id. § 1707.041(B)(3)(h).60 See id. § 1707.041 (B) (3) (a), which lists a portion of the papers to be filed with
the Division. That subsection requires filing of "copies of all prospectuses, brochures, ad-
vertisements" by which the offeror proposes to disclose. Brochures or advertisements
which at that time are already prepared would usually be used in the initial soliciting
efforts (e.g., by publication in newspapers).
61 Id. §§ 1707.041(B)(1)(c), (B)(4), (F).
6 2 Vorys, supra note 6, at 72.
63 See CODE §§ 1707.041(B)(3)(b)-(f) (Page Supp. 1969).
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employment." (2) "Complete information on the organization and
operations of [the] offeror."64  The Act proceeds to enumerate
substantially all the information about the offeror required in a
Securities Act registration, including description of the business,
capital structure, conflict of interest transactions, financial state-
ments for the current period and the 3 preceding years, and develop-
ments and changes during the past 5 years.65 This requirement,
like all those imposed by the Act, applies equally to cash and securi-
ties bids. However, the Act does not explicitly require information
about the organization and operations of the target."6 The Securities
Act requires such information in a securities bid.6" (3) Such other
data, documents, information, and exhibits "as may be required by
regulations of the division... or as may be necessary to make fair,
full, and effective disclosure to offerees of all information material
to a decision to accept or reject the offer."' The inclusion of pro-
posals or plans for changes in the target's policies of employment
illustrates one of the acknowledged purposes of the Act: to give se-
curityholders information about the impact of the takeover on third
persons such as employees of the target.69  The SEC has traditionally
limited required disclosures to areas of interest to -n investor as an
economic man, even under the Exchange Act, where the "public
interest" standards would allow a broader scope.70 The Act's entry
into the controversial arena of the public responsibility of corpora-
tions and their shareholders is extremely limited: Only a few dis-
closures along those lines are contemplated and they may be of di-
rect economic relevance to securityholders who are employees or resi-
dents of an affected area." Those disclosures in fact also bear upon
the managerial competence of the offeror and upon the target's fu-
ture profits, which in turn may influence any securityholder's de-
cision whether to hold or sell;72 and the Division's authority maui-
641,d. § 1707.041(B)(3)(g).
65 Id.
66 This may be required, however, especally in a securities bid. See text accompany-
ing notes 67-68 infra. See also text accompanying note 179 infra.
6 7 See A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, § 6.2(410).
68 CODE § 1707.041(B)(3)(h) (Page Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
69 Vorys, supra note 6, at 68.
70 For some interesting thoughts on a broader use of disclosure, see Knauss, A Reap-
praisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MIcH. L REV. 607, 646-48 (1964).
71 See Vorys, supra note 6, at 68. In light of the background of the Act, all of the
disclosures required by the Act concerning plans for changes in the operations of the
target take on more significance than the similar disclosures required by the SEC's rules
under the Williams Bill.
7 n2 Disclosures about plans for plant closings, management changes, and layoffs of
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festly cannot be exercised on grounds such as impact on local
employment, provided proper disclosure is made.7'
The Act holds the Division to a strict timetable if a hearing is
set. The hearing must be held within 40 days of filing and the
adjudication must be made within 60 days of filing.74 If the Divi-
sion finds that the offer and the proposed disclosures comply with
all of the Ohio Securities Law, including the Act, a go-ahead is
given.75 If the Division finds that the offer would comply if
amended in certain respects, the Division must so order.76 It ap-
pears, however, that the Division is empowered simply to adjudi-
cate that the offer is incurably deficient 7 7 in which event the of-
feror could start anew by presenting a revised bid and set of
disclosures .7  An aggrieved offeror has a right of judicial re-
view." It is not clear whether management may obtain such review
of a ruling adverse to it.80
The Act is silent concerning the clearance procedure applicable
employees are relevant to an investor qua investor, and he might be influenced to hold,
hoping that the offeror will gain control, effect the changes, and increase the targees
profitability.





7 8 The effect of section 1707.22 of the Code is unclear, but a revised bid would seem
to escape the delay in resubmission contained in that section.
79 The Act, subsection (B)(4), states that an adjudication by the Division shall be
pursuant to sections 119.01 to .13 of the Code. A preexisting section of the Ohio Se-
curities Law [CODE § 1707.22 (Page 1964)] allows appeals by the aggrieved party
whenever the Division takes negative action on the right of a person to buy or sell se-
curities. Section 119.12 would allow the offeror, as a "party adversely affected," to
appeal. Section 1707.22 would reach the same result because the offeror would dearly
be an "aggrieved party."
80 As pointed out in note 79 supra, this is governed by sections 119.01 to .13 and
1707.22 of the Code. Under section 119.12, one of the preconditions to judicial review
is the status as a "party adversely affected." Id. § 119.12. "Party" is defined as "the
person whose interests are the subject of an adjudication by an agency." Id. § 119.01(G).
Section 1707.22 speaks of an appeal by the "aggrieved party" whenever the Division takes
negative action on the right of a person to buy or sell securities. This indicates a nega-
tive answer. I have not undertaken a review of the case law. It may be relevant that the
Ohio Securities Law states that it creates no civil liabilities other than those specified. Id.
§ 1707.40. See also id. § 1707.38; text accompanying note 108 infra.
A Division determination not to hold a hearing seems to present even greater ob-
stacles. The explicit reference in subsection (B)(4) of the Act, which governs the con-
duct of the hearing, to sections 119.01 to .13 coupled with a lack of such reference in
subsection (B) ( 1), which empowers the Division to determine whether a hearing will be
held, may indicate a total commitment of this question to agency discretion.
An attempt by the offeror to appeal a Division determination to hold a hearing
would probably be invalid on the ground of prematurity.
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to amendments or supplements to the offeror's materials. This
raises some crucial problems. Application of the 20- to 60-day
procedure to all amendments and supplements is patently impracti-
cable in a contested takeover bid, where events move swiftly,
where the offeror is under a practical compulsion to respond to
the inevitable management counterattacks, and where the federal
standards may compel correction of earlier misstatements and dis-
semination of information about important subsequent events. For
example, the offeror, especially in a cash bid, almost necessarily
must have discretion to raise the price from the one indicated in'
the first filing. The Division, however, has adequate discretion to
adopt workable rules or procedures; and we can assume that the
Division will use its discretion properly."'
As noted, one ground for an adverse determination is a viola-
tion of any section of the Ohio Securities Law, of which the Act is
a part. Preexisting Code section 1707.13 authorizes the Division
to suspend the registration of or the right of dealers or the issuer to
buy, sell, or deal in any security if "such security is being disposed of
or purchased on grossly unfair terms, in such manner as to deceive
or defraud or as to tend to deceive or defraud purchasers or
sellers."' This standard is usually applied only to Ohio transac-
tions. It appears, however, that the Act incorporates the standard
for application on a global basis to all takeover bids covered by the
Act,813 and in any event it continues to apply to the portion of any
bid made in Ohio. In practice, it may be difficult to distinguish
"grossly unfair terms" from those which are merely unfair; and
many attorneys who practice before the Division, which has the
81 In addition to the rulemaking authority under subsection (F), the standard under
which the Division is to allow an offer to proceed requires only that the offeror pro-
poses to make fair, full, and effective disclosure. Id. §§ 1707.041(B)(1), (B)(4). This
gives the offeror an opportunity to propose a fair way in which amendments and sup-
plements are to be handled - say, by a proxy rules type of system requiring nonpublic
prefiling with the Division 2 days before use, giving the Division the right to comment
on the material before its use. Protection of the Division's enforcement rights could be
accomplished by an agreement that its approval could be revoked upon stipulated con-
tingencies.
On the presumption concerning proper use of discretion, see note 168 infra. For
recommended changes in this area, see text accompanying notes 178-84 infra.
a2 CODE § 1707.13 (Page 1964).
831d. § 1707.041(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1969), which requires a Division finding that
the bid is consistent with the Ohio Securities Law. Subsection (F)(1) [see text accom-
panying note 98 infra) indicates that the section 1707.13 standards are intended to
apply globally. Section 1707.19, which empowers the Division to prescribe antifraud
rules applicable to dealers, may also be applicable; but global application of this pro-
vision seems unlikely since only the Ohio portion of a bid must be effected through
locally registered dealers. See notes 89-91 infra & accompanying text.
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reputation as one of the most demanding of the state blue sky au-
thorities, feel that the Division in fact applies a fairness test. The
Division's authority to veto a bid made on terms which are "grossly
unfair" thus becomes quite important, especially in a securities bid.
The Williams Bill and the Securities Act contain no requirements
of substantive fairness, aside from the ratable acceptance, price in-
crease, and withdrawal provisions in the Williams Bill.
Since, however, the Act does not empower the Division to de-
termine that the exchange ratio is fair, the hearing and an affirma-
tive determination will not qualify a securities bid for an exemp-
tion from registration under section 3(a) (10) of the Securities
Act . 4
No special fees are imposed upon an offeror. If the target re-
quests a hearing, fees up to $1000 may be collected from it.85
Like the Williams Bill, the Act does not require an offer to be
made for all shares or to be made ratably to all shareholders. A
takeover bid must, however, be made to all holders who are Ohio
residents and must be made to them "on the same terms as . ..
made to holders ...not residing in [Ohio." 86 The requirements
were inserted to prevent retaliation against Ohio residents because
of the adoption of the Act."'
Even before the Act was passed, the Ohio Securities Law
reached the Ohio portion of any bid through the "grossly unfair
terms" requirement, which we have already examined, and through
section 1707.14(B), 88 which demands (with some exceptions) that
a person engaging in the business of buying or selling securities
otherwise than through Ohio-licensed dealers must register with the
Division as a dealer. A bid is apparently interpreted as constitut-
ing a "business." The Act specifically requires an offeror to com-
ply with section 1707.14(B) .89 The authors may have intended
to enlarge the Ohio Securities Law to require all takeover bid
transactions inside and outside Ohio to be consummated through
84 For an analysis of the section 3(a) (10) exemption [15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (10)
(1964)1, see 1 I Loss, supra note 14, at 584-91; 4 id. at 2597-2600 (Supp. 1969). For
a provision in the Ohio Securities Law designed to gain the exemption, see CODE §
1707.04 (Page 1964).
8 5 See CODE § 1707.041 (B) (4) (Page Supp. 1969).
8 6 See id. § 1707.041(C).
87 Vorys, supra note 6, at 70-71. See also text accompanying notes 149-52 infra.
88 CODE § 1707.14(B) (Page 1964). See also id. § 1707.19; note 83 supra.
89 Id. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1969), incorporating id. § 1707.14(B) (Page
1964).
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Ohio-registered dealers, 0 but because the duty is imposed by a cross-
reference to section 1707.14(B), which is explicitly limited to
transactions in Ohio, probably only the Ohio portion of the bid must
so qualifyY 1
The Act follows the Williams Bill in decreeing ratable accept-
ance of securities deposited during the first 10 days if more securi-
ties than the offeror has bid for and is willing to accept are depos-
ited. 2  The Williams Bill's protection that initial depositors will
benefit from any increase in price is also included." The Williams
Bill allows an offeree to withdraw during the first 7 days or after
60 days (if the tender has not been accepted). 4 The Act has no
similar provision.
C. Application of the Act to Persons Other Than Offerors
Neither the Act nor any preexisting provision of the Ohio Se-
curities Law imposes duties on management or anyone other than
an offeror.9 5 Under both the Law and the Act, management will
be free to solicit shareholder opposition to the bid free of antifraud
or disclosure requirements. The draftsmen undoubtedly relied upon
the antifraud prohibitions under Rule lob-5 and section 14(e) of
the Exchange Act to prevent misstatements, half-truths, and other
unfair practices by management or by other persons recommending
acceptance or rejection. 96 Those federal requirements will not, how-
ever, prevent management from attacking the offer during the wait-
ing period, when the offeror seemingly can do or say nothing on
the bid itselff
90 One proponent of the Act mentions the requirement but does not explicitly
state that it is global. Vorys, supra note 6, at 70.
9 1 Section 1707.14, especially when coupled with section 1707.01(E)(1), seems
clearly limited to Ohio transactions. Though territorial limitation thus seems indi-
cated, such an interpretation causes the incorporation to be surplusage, as subsection
(G) of the Act explicitly preserves preexisting requirements of the Ohio Securities law.
9 2 CODE § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1969).
93 Id.
94 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
9 5 It is unlikely that subsections F (1) and F(3) can be applied to anyone other than
an offeror.
96 On the federal controls, see A. BROMiBERG, sopra note 14.
9 7 The SEC would probably have authority under sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the
Exchange Act to adopt such a rule. Cf. SEC Exchange Act Rule 10b-13, adopted in SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969). The Rule, reprinted in 2 CCH Fm.
SEC. L. REP. g 22,733, at 16,621-3, prohibits purchases during a tender offer other than
pursuant to the offer. For examples of other management responses to a takeover bid,
see text accompanying note 171 infra,
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D. Enforcement and Administration of the Act
The Division's regulations may play a major role in determin-
ing the impact of the Act. The Division is authorized to prescribe
reasonable regulations defining terms used in the Act and "fraud-
ulent, evasive, deceptive, or grossly unfair practices in connection
with take-over bids.... The quoted language refers to standards
contained elsewhere in the Ohio Securities Law and incorporated
by the Act, as the Act contains no general antifraud prohibition.
Reasonable Division regulations may also deal with "such other
matters as are necessary to give effect to [the Act]."9"
To date, the Division has proposed no regulations. Although
it has promulgated Forms 041 and 041 (B) (4) for filing of infor-
mation and request for a hearing, respectively, these forms largely
paraphrase the Act and provide few additional specifics. 100 For an
offeror contemplating a bid, the present generality is troublesome.
For example, we have examined the crucial question, which re-
mains unanswered, of how amendments and supplements are to be
handled.'- In addition, the Division's standards for application
of the "grossly unfair terms" requirement are largely unpublished.
One hopes that more definite administrative guides will be is-
sued. Although it is a truism that an agency administering a se-
curities statute must retain considerable discretion in order to deal
with the unusual features or disclosure questions in each transaction
and to reach clever evasions (which seldom appear twice in the
same guise), better policy and smoother, more evenhanded ad-
ministration almost necessarily result from the fashioning and
publication of guides identifying what the agency will routinely ac-
cept or reject and what the agency will judge on a case-by-case
basis in light of stated policy principles.0 2 We can assume that
the Division will properly exercise the discretion which the Act,
uninterpreted by administrative guides, leaves in its hands for ad
hoc exercise, 1 3 but more definite standards would be extremely
helpful.
98 CODE § 1707.041(F)(1) (Page Supp. 1969).
991d. § 1707.041(F)(3).
100 An exception is the requirement for finanacial statements relating to the current
period. See id. §§ 1707.041(G)-(H).
101 See text accompanying note 81 supra.
102 For a classic article bearing on the choice between rulemaking and adjudication,
see Shapiro, The Choice of Rulokmaking or Adjudication in The Development of Ad-
ministrative Policy, 78 HARV. L REv. 921 (1965).
03 See note 168 infra.
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The criminal penalties of the Ohio Securities Law and the Divi-
sion's injunctive authority apply to any violation of the Act.104
The Act also grants offerees express rights of rescission and dam-
ages against offerors This is done by stating that "an offeror is
subject to the liabilities and penalties applicable to a seller, and an
offeree is entitled to the remedies applicable to a purchaser, as set
forth in sections 1707.041 to 1707.44."15 Under those sections, a
purchaser has certain damage and rescission rights against a seller
who has used materially false offering materials or has other-
wise made a sale or contract for sale in violation of any section of
the Law.
The Ohio Securities Law, however, has no long-arm section, and
the general Ohio long-arm provision does not reach purchases and
sales outside Ohio. 08 Nor does the Act require the offeror to file
a consent to service of process. 0
Enforcement of the Act other than by governmental actions or
damage or rescission cases brought by selling shareholders is
highly uncertain. There will be great difficulty in obtaining re-
lief such as a denial of voting rights to tainted shares or a decree
of divestiture on an implied private rights theory. The Ohio Se-
curities Law proclaims that, although it does not limit common
law actions for fraud or deceit, it creates no civil liabilities other
than those specified.' 08 Indeed, management and shareholders
(tendering or non-tendering) may be without standing even to ob-
tain injunctive relief under the Ohio Securities Law against an offer
being made in patent disregard of the Act.
The enforcement mechanisms are thus less sophisticated than
those developed under the federal acts'0 9 and those found in some
of the other state takeover statutes." 0 Even the right to damages
and rescission may prove limited with respect to sales made by
104 CODE §§ 1707.25-.26, .36, .44-.47, .99 (Page 1964). In a cash bid, there may
be difficulty ia applying some of these sections, as they were written primarily to cover
sellers, not buyers, of securities.
105 Id. § 1707.041 (E) (Page Supp. 1969). The reference to sections 1707.041 to
1707.44 is a misprint. The reference should be to sections 1707.41 to 1707.44.
1061d. §§ 2307.381-85.
107 In a securities bid, the offeror may have to file such a consent under a preexisting
section of the Ohio Securities Law, but it would relate only to an action "growing out
of a fraud committed .. .in connection with the sale of ... securities in [Ohio]."
Id. § 1707.11 (Page 1964).
108Id. § 1707A0. Seeadso id. § 1707.38.
109 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
110 See text accompanying notes 195-99 infra.
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 722
securityholders outside Ohio when enforcement is attempted in the
courts of sister states."1  The staggering potential liabilities inher-
ent in the right to damages and rescission are probably sufficient,
however, to prevent deliberate violations of the Act.
III. VALIDITY OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL COVERAGE
A. Corporations Incorporated in Ohio
Aside from the Act, the Ohio Securities Law follows the near-
universal pattern of territoriality established in American blue sky
legislation. The blue sky laws cover only offers, purchases, or sales
which to some substantial extent are made in or from the state,
thus evidencing a purpose of prevention of fraud and unfair prac-
tices in securities transactions within, or made from within, its
borders." 2  The residence and domicile of the participants and
place of organization of the issuer of the securities are usually im-
material." 3  The Act has quite a different stated purpose: "[T]o
protect [all] shareholders [wherever located] of Ohio and Ohio-
based corporations by requiring public announcement and fair, full,
and effective disclosures to shareholders in regard to take-over
bids.""' 4  We have seen the interpretive problems created by plac-
ing the Act in the Securities Law rather than in the General Cor-
poration Law, which (like the Act) is of global application to Ohio
corporations.11" Our concern, however, is with the constitutional-
ity of the extraterritorial reach that survives the interpretive prob-
lems - a reach demanding that the preclearance, waiting period,
disclosure, substantive fairness, pro rata take-up, and price increase
provisions apply globally.
The federal statutes expressly disclaim any effect on state reg-
ulation of securities, except to the extent it conflicts with the fed-
eral requirements." 6 The Act does not "conflict" with the federal
statutes. For this purpose, "conflict" has been interpreted nar-
rowly as comprehending only state regulation making impossible a
compliance with federal standards.117 That is difficult to find
"'l See generally text accompanying notes 112-65 infra.
112 See Loss & CowETr, supra note 38, at 211-12,401-05.
113 Special treatment is sometimes afforded securities of domestic corporations. See,
e.g., CODE § 1707.06 (Page 1964).
114 Amend. Sub. S.B. No. 138, File No. 90, at 1 (Reg. Sess. 1969-70).
"15 See text accompanying notes 38-40, 89-91 supra.
116 See 1 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 155-57; 4 id. at 2293-94 (Supp. 1969).
117 See, e.g., SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 40 (Feb. 5, 1945), in 3
CCIH FED. SEc. L REP. 55 56,374-77, at 44,077-79; id. No. 8 (Dec. 12, 1940), in 3 CCH
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when nearly all of the federal regulation prohibits transactions un-
less its standards are met rather than requires transactions to be
undertaken, and the SEC has studiously avoided the creation of
regulatory conflicts.1 18  When the original blue sky cases, decided
in 1917, upheld the blue sky laws against commerce clause and
14th amendment objections, the Court was dealing with territor-
ial statutes, and a basis for the holding that the statutes did not
unduly burden commerce was their limited geographical reach.11
The preemption disclaimers in the federal statutes indicate, how-
ever, at least that the only national uniformity Congress deems
necessary is that obtained by establishing the minimum standards
specified in those statutes. It would seem, therefore, that a com-
merce clause objection based upon an alleged "undue burden" on
commerce would probably be no more potent than challenges to
Ohio's legislative jurisdiction based on the due process and full
faith and credit dauses.1 0 Under these last two clauses, the geo-
graphical coverage of the Act, even in today's judicial climate,
does raise questions of legislative jurisdiction.12'
An implicit premise of the Act is that a takeover bid is essen-
tially an internal affairs matter - one involving "the relatioh-
ships inter sese of the corporation, its directors, officers, and stock-
holders" - which Ohio may reasonably regulate on a global ba-
FrD. SEc. L RiP. 5 56,420-21, at 44,086. Cf. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393
U.S. 453 (1969).
118 See, e.g., SEC releases cited note 117 supra. Note, however, that reorganization
orders entered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Investment Com-
pany Act will often necessarily conflict with state law and will take precedence over it.
See 1 L Loss, supra note 14, at 157 & n.95.
119 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-59 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls
Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 567-68 (1917); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568,
590 (1917). An important subsequent case is Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643 (1950).
120 Cf. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Brotherhood of Loco,-
motive Firemen & Eng'rs v. Chicago & R.I.R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968); Markedines,
Inc. v. Chamberlain, 63 11. App. 2d 274,211 N.E.2d 399 (1965).
The precise effect of the preemption disclaimers is uncltar, although they manifestly
stop short of the McCarran-Ferguson Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964)), which
greatly expanded state power to regulate and tax the "business of insurance." See
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). In SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., supra, the Court held that state statutes which focus -on the protection of stock-
holders of insurance companies are outside the McCarran-Ferguison Act's protection of
the states' rights to regulate the "business of insurance." The Court also indicated,
however, that the state stockholder-protection statutory provision (which required the
Director of Insurance to find, as a precondition to the approval of a merger, that the
merger would not be inequitable to the stockholders of any domestic insurer) could
coexist with federal securities regulation because of the preemption disclaimers in the
latter. See also note 138 infra.
121 Cf. FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 302, 305-06 (1960).
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sis.122  If a takeover bid can fairly be so classified, Ohio is right
insofar as Ohio corporations are concerned. Acting on a felt need
for uniform resolution of internal affairs questions such as share-
holders liability, validity of stock issues, ability to merge and ef-
fect other organic changes, election of directors, voting trusts
and voting agreements, dividends, relative rights of shareholders,
and duties of officers, directors, and controlling shareholders to the
corporation and to shareholders, American courts almost invariably
decide these questions (in the absence of a local statute to the con-
trary) by applying the incorporating state's law, regardless of
where the operative acts occurred." 3 To some uncertain extent,
there is a constitutional compulsion under the full faith and credit
and due process clauses that the incorporating state's law be ap-
plied."M The near-unanimity has survived the recent eclecticism in
12 The quoted language is from Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate
Affairs: Choice of Law and the Scope of Full Faith and Credit, 58 CoLum. L REV.
1118, 1124 (1958).
123 See, e.g., RESTATE MmNT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS, pt. III, at 376-412
(Proposed Official Draft, April 22, 1969); Reese & Kaufman, supra note 122.
The Williams Bill and the proxy rules, which require no use of the means of in-
strumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce as a jurisdictional nexus, literally
apply to any cash tender offer or proxy solicitation (wherever conducted) with refer-
ence to securities of a corporation incorporated in the United States if the securities are
registered under Exchange Act section 12. Indeed, the Williams Bill's antifraud pro-
vision [Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV, 1969)] appears to
dispense with the section 12 nexus. See A. BROmBERG, supra note 14, §§ 6.3 (230)-
(250). SEC Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 and the Securities Act are inapplicable if no
means or instrumentalities of commerce are used in any part of the transaction. Section
30(b) of the Exchange Act makes that statute inapplicable to "any person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States" unless the
SEC promulgates regulations (which it has not done) to prevent evasions. 15 U.S.C.
I 78dd(b) (1964). The leading current case on extraterritorial application of the
federal securities requirements is Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 400 P.2d 200 (2d Cir.),
rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969), which gave an expansive interpretation to SEC Exchange Act Rule
lob-5 as applied to a foreign corporation. For an excellent discussion of this question,
'ee Note, United States Taxation and Regulation of Offshore Mutual Funds, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 404, 426-52 (1969).
24 The most relevant Supreme Court authority is limited to two areas. First, a
policyholder's rights against a fraternal benefit association are governed by the law of
the state of incorporation. Order of Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331
U.S. 586 (1947). In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964), Wolfe
was referred to as "a highly specialized decision dealing with unique facts.'
Second, statutes of the incorporating state providing for assessment of shareholders
for the benefit of creditors must be enforced by other states. Broderick v. Rosner, 294
U.S. 629, 643 (1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912). But cf. Pink v.
A.A.A. Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941). A state statute may, however, impose liabil-
ity on a shareholder of a foreign corporation for an act of the corporation in the state.
.'ee Thomas v. Mathieson, 232 U.S. 221 (1914); Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144
(1901).
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conflict of laws principles.125 The exceptions to the pattern of the
application of the law of the state of incorporation have concerned
pseudo-foreign corporations and the relatively infrequent situation
where a local statute specifically regulates some facets of the internal
affairs of foreign corporations having local contacts. 126
Nearly all internal affairs regulation designed for securityholder
protection imposes obligations on the corporation in its dealings
with the securityholders, or on officers, directors, or controlling
persons in their dealings with shareholders or the corporation. Be-
cause the Act imposes obligations upon the insurgent tender offeror
in dealing with shareholders, the question is raised whether this
type of regulation falls within the ambit of internal affairs regu-
lation. In analogous areas, there is already considerable extrater-
ritorial state regulation reaching insurgents' transactions with
shareholders. On a mechanical level, the form of proxies solicited
by insurgents must meet those few minimal requirements found in
the statutes of the state of incorporation.127  A more important
type of requirement along these lines has resulted from the 1964
amendments to the Exchange Act, in which Congress exempted
over-the-counter insurance companies from the Exchange Act's re-
porting, proxy, and insider trading requirements on the condition
that the state of incorporation provide comparable regulation. 8
Almost all state legislatures responded. The result includes, in
addition to state versions of section 16 of the Exchange Act, state
versions of section 14 governing all proxy solicitations by insur-
gents. 29 To this enumeration should be added the limitations upon
voting trusts and voting agreements. 30
Nevertheless, good arguments can be mustered for the proposi-
tion that sales in other states by minority shareholders to an out-
sider are not internal affairs transactions which may be regulated
by the state of incorporation. The formal structure of the target
The present impact of this body of law, especially outside the narrow areas specifi-
cally involved, is uncertain. See text accompanying notes 146-47, 153-65 infra.
125 Concerning the various schools, see D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
(1965).
1 26 See text accompanying notes 153-65 infra.
127 E.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit 8, § 212 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968).
12 8 See Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706, 747-54.
129 5 L Loss, supra note 14, at 2741-60 (Supp. 1969).
130E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968). On
state regulation of the fairness of merger terms, see discussion of SEC v. National Secu-
rities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), in notes 120 supra, 138 infra.
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remains unaffected by a takeover. Action at the corporate level
contractually binding all shareholders is missing, unlike the result
in, say, a vote approving a merger, consolidation, or liquidation.
Free transferability of shares is an economic, if not legal, precondi-
tion of a publicly held company.' Moreover, the takeover bid it-
self necessarily involves diversity rather than uniformity in various
shareholders' elections to tender or not.
On closer examination, however, it is easier to make the case
that a takeover bid is so similar to classical internal affairs trans-
actions that the state of incorporation has legislative jurisdiction
to prescribe reasonable uniform regulation. Bids are by definition
made by an incipient controlling person who under traditional
common law doctrines will acquire, upon successful completion
of the bid, a liducry-relationship to the corporation and all of
its securityholders. 32 The offeror may have acquired inside infor-
mation about the target in prior unsuccessful merger negotiations
with management, and there may be tacit understandings or arrange-
ments with management. Furthermore, the offeror is acquiring
his controlling block from a group of securityholders acting in con-
cert through the unifying mechanism of a tender offer. Though
corporate action is missing, there is mass common action by per-
sons whose only mutual link is the target, and their actions will
profoundly affect the target and nontendering shareholders. If
control is a corporate asset, corporate property is being transferred.1 3
Furthermore, for the tendering securityholder in a securities bid,
the effects are similar to those resulting from a merger, a classic
internal affairs transaction.
Most important, a successful tender offer, which by definition
marks -shift-or -probable shift in control, is usually the first step
toward a change in the composition of directors or in their policies.
The securityholder wfi-6ses somesecurities and keeps some -
and often he must keep some because the offer is only for a con-
trolling block - may be selling those of his securities taken up, but
he is also electing future directors and determining future board
policy to govern the remainder of his securities. In this respect, a
takeover bid is a de facto proxy-solicitation as well. This point
can also be mad-e-with respect to the amalgamations and other ma-
131 See Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L REv.
259 (1967).
132 E.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
133 Cf. Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL LQ. 628
(1965).
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jor organic changes often following a bid: Securities not taken up
are as a practical matter locked into the offeror's future plans if
the bid is successful.
This analysis can also be extended to the bid for all outstanding
securities. Even there, the individual securityholder retains the
right to tender in part or at least to tender not at all. The offeror
may not desire these options to be open, but at least the, latter is
totally beyond its control (aside from a stipulation 'that unless at
least, say, 80 percent of all outstanding securities are tendered, the
offer may be called off). A concept underlying the Williams Bill
is that among the possibilities open to the securityholder is reten-
tion of his securities, which would in essence be new securities.
One of the ways in which the securities will differ is that the voting
power will effectively be diminished. By deciding not to tender,
a securityholder is selecting the offeror as the steward of his in-
terest-in the corporation.
None of these arguments is itself wholly' satisfying, but the
cumulative effect indicates, I believe, that a takeover bid is similar
enough to a proxy solicitation so that the state of incorporation can
regulate the practices of insurgents in the former to substantially
the same extent as in the latter. And it does not harm Ohio's
case to show that Congress, in passing the Williams Bill, found
takeover bids functionally similar to proxy fights .134 A concept of
de facto proxy solicitation also supports the Act's requirement that
cash bids as well as securities bids employ a disclosure document
rather comprehensively describing the offeror's organization, opera-
tions, and financial condition. In either type of bid, success will
substantially lessen the actual potential voting power of securities
not tendered or accepted; there will often be at least some amalga-
mation of the offeror's and the target's business and financial opera-
tions; and a merger in the not-so-distant future is always a sub-
stantial possibility. Thus, even in a cash bid, comprehensive
information about the offeror's organization, operations, and finan-
cial condition is useful.
The Act, however, has effects other than securityholder protec-
tion. The Act's securityholder protections solidify management
tenure and, by doing so, also increase the probability that Ohio
plants and offices will not be moved to other states, a step that a
successful offeror would usually be more likely to take than an
incumbent management with strong local ties. This latter effect
134 H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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raises a possible question, under the commerce clause, about the
validity of Ohio's legislative jurisdiction. These effects, further-
more, were not unrecognized by the management proponents of the
Act or the General Assembly. But the Act, as written, should be
adjudged a legitimate securityholder protection statute. The
Act limits itself to regulatory techniques that in similar contexts
are widely used for securityholder protection. Disclosure is the
foundation of securities regulation. A waiting period is found in
the Securities Act; and though rarely used, the Securities Act
provides for a hearing procedure roughly similar to the Act's.135
A power to veto a securities transaction because of "grossly unfair
terms" stops short of the substantive standards sometimes em-
ployed. 36 One need not conclude that these techniques are op-
timal or even clearly beneficial to investors in the long run in
order to note that their ubiquity establishes them as recognized
means of securityholder protection, which in turn is recognized as
a legitimate aim of corporations and securities laws. Furthermore,
corporations and securities laws always have substantial impacts on
persons such as promoters, insurgents, and management: The laws
protect securityholders against overreaching or unfairness by these
groups and in doing so limit their power. Regulation of a contest
between insurgents and management necessarily affects the bal-
ance of power, and indeed a legislative body attempting to provide
securityholder protection through a technique such as disclosure
must determine the balance that is most beneficial to security-
holders. As written, the Act is not a de facto prohibition of
takeovers, but rather is a not unreasonable attempt to balance. 3 '
The management proponents of the Act may have been pri-
marily interested in strengthening their tenure rights. The Gen-
eral Assembly may have been sympathetic to that interest and un-
doubtedly was concerned about keeping Ohio plants and offices
in Ohio. But since the Act, as written, effects these objectives
only to a limited extent, incidental to the use of procedures which
have widely been thought to afford major protections to security-
135 Securities Act § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b) (1964). See 1 L. Loss, supra note 14,
at 270-71.
136 E.g., Texas Securities Act of 1957, §§ 7C(2), 10, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. arts.
581-7(C) (2), -10 (1964) ("fair, just, and equitable"). Even if the Division does
administer the test as if it prohibits "unfair terms" [see text accompanying notes 82-83
supra], a standard of "grossly unfair terms" rather than "unfair terms" should make
a considerable difference in judicial review.
137 See also text accompanying notes 167-70 infra.
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holders, the Act should be considered a valid securityholder-
protection statute:3
The Act, however, will not displace the territorial application
of other states' blue sky laws to a bid which it governs."3 9 The
Act does not, of course, express such an aim. A bid may have
many effects, but it is after all cast in the form of an offer to buy
or to buy and sell securities. Territorial regulation, especially of
businesses such as securities and insurance which are affected-with
a special public interest, is historically well established and is not
constitutionally prohibited because of impact outside the state's
borders; one of the original blue sky cases concerned application
of a local statute to a foreign corporation wishing to sell its se-
curities in the state.140 Even a merger, a classical internal affairs
transaction, may have no constitutional immunity to the territorial
blue sky regulation of the various states in addition to the regula-
tion by the incorporating state, although the blue sky laws usually
provide an exemption.'41 Ohio's global regulation of takeover
138 Vorys states that disclosure of plans to dose down offices and plants (and typi-
cally these would be Ohio offices and plants) is an objective of the Act, and he notes
that disclosure of such plans may discourage tenders. See Vorys, supra note 6, at 68.
See also text accompanying notes 69-73 supra.
The Supreme Court "has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring
business operations to be performed in the home State which could be more efficiently
performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a legitimate local interest, this
particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal." Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970). If administered fairly, however, [see
text accompanying notes 168-70 infra] the Act should have only an incidental impact on
the mobility of Ohio offices and plants.
A state stockholder-protection statute requiring a finding by a state official of fair-
ness to stockholders before a merger of a domestic corporation is approved introduces
immobiliies, but such statutes seem permissible. See the discussion of SEC v. National
Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), in note 120 supra.
139 None of the common exemptions or exclusions would be applicable. For ex-
ample, section 401 (j) (6) of the Uniform Securities Act excludes from coverage a "ju-
dicially" approved reorganization and amalgamations approved by corporate action
through a class vote of shareholders. Furthermore, the hearing procedure in the Act does
not purport to bind shareholders or even to make provision for notice to them or par-
ticipation by them.
For a cash offeror, only antifraud sections and broker-dealer registration provisions
must be met. The latter provisions will, in some states, require the offeror either to
register as a broker-dealer or to purchase through a firm locally registered as such. In
addition to these requirements, a securities offeror must register the securities offered
in exchange unless some exemption (e.g., for securities listed on a major exchange) is
available.
140 See, e.g., the blue sky cases cited note 119 supra, cf. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966); Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
141 The SEC has proposed a revision of SEC Securities Act Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. §
230.133 (1969), reprinted in 1 CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 3011, at 3051-53, recognizing
that for all purposes a merger of X into Z in which X's shareholders receive Z securities
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bids is, moreover, a controversial newcomer to internal affairs
regulation. Furthermore, a takeover bid lacks corporate action or
a change in the corporation's organic structure; and the need for
uniformity is not so intense as in classical internal affairs ques-
tions such as the validity of a stock issue or of a merger, especially
since the Act does not require that the offer be made to all share-
holders.'4 All of this means, I believe, that other states certainly
can and undoubtedly will decide that their regulation of transac-
tions within their borders will not abate because the Act is appli-
cable. 143
There will be no conflict between the Act and other states'
blue sky laws in the sense that compliance with the former will
not force the offeror to violate the latter. Both can be complied
with. When residents of sister states bring rescission or damage
actions in their courts based upon violations of the Act and the
local blue sky laws (or local common law fraud doctrines), there
would be no inconsistency in a choice of law allowing the seller to
assert both causes of action, though obtaining only a single recov-
ery. The bases of legislative jurisdiction are different: Ohio is ap-
plying its statute for the benefit of all shareholders on an inter-
nal affairs base and the fornm is regulating locally on a territorial
base. Similar overlaps occur whenever an internal affairs transac-
tion involves purchases and sales of securities and the various states
choose to regulate the securities transactions on a local basis. The
special problem arises here because the general corporation laws
directing internal affairs seldom attempt to assure adequate dis-
closure or fairness in securities transactions; by entering that do-
main, the Act is to some extent duplicating the blue sky laws.
That, however, does not mean that the latter cannot coexist with
the former. Moreover, the Uniform Securities Act contemplates
that a securities transaction may be governed by the blue sky laws
of two states, each having a substantial contact with the transac-
is a sale by Z. See Securities Act Release No. 5012 (Oct. 9, 1969), reprinted in [Cur-
rent Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 77,748, at 83,716-21 (1969).
Section 401(j) (6) of the Uniform Securities Act exempts a merger, and section
402(b) (11) exempts certain offerings to existing shareholders.
There is no square Supreme Court authority on the interrelationship of the blue sky
cases, note 119 supra, and the internal affairs principle. The most relevant recent litiga-
tion is the Western Air Lines case, notes 156-58 infra & accompanying text.
142 For an illuminating discussion of the factors to be weighed, see Reese & Kauf-
man, supra note 122.
143 As indicated in note 139 supra, the hearing procedure is not designed or in-
tended to-bind shareholders.
THE ROLE OF STATE LEGISLATION
tion,1' and courts 'are accustomed to this approach where rights
under federal and state laws are asserted. In addition, the general
objective of the Act and blue sky statutes - investor protection -
is the same.'45
There is, however, a possible conflict in the policies of te
few states with takeover acts and those without them. Regulatn
of securities transactions protects investors from profitable as well
as unprofitable deals. Determining the optimum level of securiies
regulation is a relatively delicate, albeit unscientific, business. One
of the bases on which lines are drawn is that investors may be
harmed by overregulation, since regulation decreases the number
of buy and sell opportunities presented to them. A state without
a takeover statute applicable to domestic corporations may have
made an implicit judgment that investors will derive the greatest
benefit from takeover bids absent a level of regulation superadded
to the federal statutes and the various blue sky laws. Such a state
may also wish to encourage takeovers. Thus, when a resident
of a sister state asserts rights under the Act with respect to sales
made to the offeror in that state, it is possible that the local court
will perceive a conflict between the Act and local law and will ap-
ply only the latter. 48 The factors which preclude displacement
of the local law - the numerous and strong local 'contacts, the
newness of the Act as internal affairs legislation, and the rela-
tively unintense need for uniform resolution of the question. of the
validity of the offer - make this a possible result, especially so
long as state takeover acts remain few in number and takeover leg-
islation remains controversial. This choice of law would probably
be constitutionally permissible under current Supreme Court de-
1 44 See UNIFoRm SEcuRmIs AcT §§ 414(a)-(d); Loss & CowETr, supra note 38,
at 402.
145 Cf. Reese & Kaufman, supra note 122, at 1138 (discussion, in a related context,
of the importance to be attached to a determination that all interested states have the
same basic policy).
146 See Gaillard v. Field, 381 F.2d 25 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044
(1968). Oklahoma residents sold fractional interests in oil and gas leases located. in
Oklahoma, Texas, Nebraska, and Colorado to California residents. Oklahoma exempts
such interests from its blue sky law. California does no. The interests were not quali-
fied under the California blue sky law. The California residents sued for rescission in
the federal district court in Oklahoma. The trial court seemingly assumed that the
California law covered the transaction but refused to apply it, holding that state regu-
lation of such oil and gas transactions was contrary to Oklahoma's public policy. The
court of appeals affirmed, holding that in this case the interests of California and Okla-
homa were antagonistic, that application of the California law "would violate a deep-
rooted tradition of the common weal in Oklahoma," and that Oklahoma had sufficient
important contacts to justify its conflicts rule that would bar application of California
law. 381 F.2d at 28-29.
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cisions, which allow a court to apply the law of the forum if it has
substantial contacts with the transaction and governmental interest
in applying its law. 147 Application of both statutes also would be
permissible, as Ohio would have substantial contacts and govern-
mental interest in regulating the transaction.
The most likely result, and the desirable one, is the applica-
tion of both statutes. Although the local blue sky statutes will
apply because a bid involves purchases or purchases and sales, a
bid's similarities to mergers or proxy solicitations are not difficult
to appreciate. Aside from Ohio-based companies, Ohio is not at-
tempting to impinge upon other states' policies with respect to
corporations incorporated there. And as a practical matter it is
only through use of the internal affairs base, as opposed to a ter-
ritorial base, that the states can set uniform minimum standards of
protection for securityholders of corporations.
My conclusions thus are that Ohio has legislative jurisdiction
to pass the Act as global legislation, but that because of the over-
lap in governmental interests the Act will not displace the blue
sky laws of other states and that it is possible that the Act will
not be applied by their courts in addition to those laws. The first
conclusion, that Ohio has legislative jurisdiction, assumes that
Ohio's regulation is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious in
the constitutional sense. The Act, it seems to me, easily passes
that test. Later in this article, I make numerous recommendations
for amendments to the Act to narrow what I consider some sub-
stantial gaps between its stated purposes and its effects. Even if
my perceptions are correct, however, the gaps fall far short of rais-
ing serious constitutional questions.' 48
Ironically, what appears to be the only major constitutional
question in the Act's extraterritorial coverage of bids for Ohio
corporations results from its lapse into territorial parochialism in
requiring that a bid be made to all Ohio residents and made to
them on most-favored-purchaser terms, while omitting residents of
other states from these protections.149  If the Act were a territorial
one applying to the Ohio portion of bids for any corporation,
these provisions would probably be valid. 50 But by applying the
1'4 7 See Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
377 U.S. 179 (1964); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962); cf. Clark v. Wil-
lard, 294 U.S. 211 (1935). See also Gaillard v. Field, 381 F.2d 25 (10th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968).
148 See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
14 9 See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
150 See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
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Act globally to Ohio and Ohio-based corporations through an
internal affairs concept, this discrimination is probably unconstitu-
tional, at least insofar as individual residents of other states are
concerned. 15' This infirmity - which should not affect the re-
mainder of the Act in light of the severability clause and the
Act's dear implicit reliance upon internal affairs regulation as the
base for extraterritorial jurisdiction - could be cured either by
deleting the requirements or by dictating that bids be made ratably
and on the same terms to all holders. The Division may have au-
thority under the Act to impose the latter alternative. " '
B. Foreign Corporations Based in Ohio
The Act appears to be the only state takeover statute covering
foreign corporations. Some of the foreign corporations accorded
'1 See Blake v. McClung, 176 U.S. 59 (1900); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239
(1898). A Tennessee statute provided that in proceedings governing the local assets
of an insolvent foreign corporation, Tennessee residents would have a priority in distri-
bution. As to individuals resident in other states, this was held to violate the inter-
state privileges and immunities clause, which provides that "the Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2. The evil in the statute was that it excluded "citizens of other States
from transacting business with the corporation upon terms of equality with citizens of
Tennessee." 172 U.S. at 252.
One of the plaintiffs was a Virginia corporation. Although corporations had by
that time been recognized as "persons" entitled to 14th amendment protections, the
Court followed the precedent, holding a corporation not to be a "citizen" protected
by the interstate privileges and immunities clause. The Court also decided that the
Tennessee court judgment did not "deprive" the Virginia corporation of its property
under the due process clause and that because the corporation was not "within [Tennes-
see's) jurisdiction," the equal protection clause was of no avail. Id. at 260.
The Act's discrimination in favor of Ohio residents places citizens of other states in
an unequal position in their ownership of equity securities of Ohio and Ohio-based
corporations, as they will not be guaranteed that the offer will be extended to them on
most-favored-purchaser terms. This discrimination may, of course, also run afoul of
constitutional provisions (e.g., the commerce clause) other than the interstate privileges
and immunities clause.
As a practical matter, however, the constitutional question may seldom arise, for
nearly all tender offers are in fact open to all holders at a uniform price.
Note that the Act seemingly does not require that materials making the offer be
delivered to all Ohio residents. For a proposed amendment requiring the offer to be
mailed to each shareholder, see text accompanying note 194 infra.
152 The Division seemingly is authorized to veto a bid proposed on grossly unfair
terms. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra. Moreover, the Division's regulations
may cover such "matters as are necessary to give effect to [the Act)." See text ac-
companying notes 98-99 supra. We have noted one problem - that of amendments
and supplements to the offeror's materials - where the Division will have to use its
adaptive powers in order to make the Act work. See note 81 supra & accompanying
text.
Concerning the relationship to the constitutional issue of this probably existing Divi-
sion discretion to prevent unconstitutional treatment, see note 168 infra & accompany-
ing text. For a suggested amendment to cure the defect, see text accompanying note
194 infra.
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the Act's protection will be pseudo-foreign - substantially all rele-
vant contacts, aside from the state of incorporation, will be with
Ohio. Ohio's legislative jurisdiction over the internal affairs of
such corporations probably equals its right to legislate concerning
domestic corporations. 5 3
To classify a foreign corporation as Ohio-based, however, re-
quires nothing more than showing that it has its principal place of
business and "substantial assets" in the state. Principal place of
business may or may not mean home office,154 and substantial
property may or may not mean only a substantial absolute dollar
value.'55 The percentage of all outstanding shares held by Ohio
residents is immaterial.
California's assertion of jurisdiction in the Western Air Lines15
litigation was less aggressive. Though Western Air Lines was not
the classic pseudo-foreign corporation, its principal place of busi-
ness and more than 75 percent of its tangible property were in
153 See Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952); State ex
rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948), cert. denied sub no=.,
Bechtel v. Thatcher, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); RESTATEMEm (SEcoND) OF CoNFIcr
OF LAWS § 302, Comment g (Proposed Official Draft, April 22, 1969); Latty, Pseudo-
Foreign Corporations, 65 YAI.E L.J. 137 (1955). See also cases cited note 147 supra.
154 On the conflicting decisions under section 1332(c) of the Judicial Code [28
U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964)] concerning the location of the "principal place of business"
when the home office and actual place of operations do not coincide, see Comment,
The Corporate Principal Place of Business: A Resolution and Revision, 34 GEo.
WASa L REv. 780 (1966).
155 That is the literal reading, but in light of the purpose of the section - to iden-
tify those foreign corporations which might be treated in the same way as corporations
incorporated under Ohio law - the other construction, "a substantial portion," is
possible.
156 Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719
(1961). For subsequent decisions in the same litigation, see Western Air Lines, Inc. V.
Schutzbank, 258 Cal. App. 2d 218, 66 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1968); People ex rel. Sobieski
v. Western Air Lines, Inc, 258 Cal. App. 2d 213, 66 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1968). Citations
to the extensive law review commentary are found in 1 L Loss, supra note 14, at 70-71;
4 id. at 2246-51 (Supp. 1969).
This protracted litigation apparently was settled as a result of the enactment of
the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, wherein securities listed on the New
York Stock Exchange were exempted. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25100(o) (West Supp.
1970). Western's common stock is, and was throughout the litigation, listed on the
New York Stock Exchange. The stock presently has no cumulative voting rights.
See MOODY'S TRANSPORTATION MANUAL 1364 (Sept. 1969).
The California Securities Law of 1968 expands California's jurisdiction beyond that
claimed in Western Air Lines. A substantial change in the terms of outstanding se-
curities or a merger into another corporation are subject, generally speaking, to Cali-
fornia's standards if 25 percent of the outstanding shares (excluding street-name
shares) are held by persons with California addresses. CAI_ CORP. CODE §§ 25103,
25110, 25120 (West Supp. 1970). But as noted above, the new statute exempts from
nearly all of its requirements securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
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California; approximately 50 percent of its rental payments were
made for the use of land situated there; 60 percent of its wages
were paid to California employees; its principal bank accounts
were there; approximately 34 percent of its passenger traffic was
entirely in California and about 54 percent either originated or
terminated in the state; and probably more than 50 percent of its
stock was held by California residents. 11S Furthermore, Western
Air Lines had no contact with Delaware other than its charter. In
addition, California was asserting territorial regulation: It was pur-
porting to regulate the offers and sales effected in California
through the solicitation of proxies for approval of the removal of
cumulative voting rights, which California considered to be the
exchange of stock. This difference can easily be overemphasized,
however, as a final California veto would have prevented the re-
moval.' 58
The Act's coverage also outreaches the SEC regulations under
the Exchange Act determining the reporting, proxy, and insider
trading obligations of foreign over-the-counter issuers, though the
SEC's regulations do focus in part upon the location of a corpora-
tion's headquarters. A foreign corporation is treated as a United
States company if (1) its business is administered principally in
the United States or its board has as 50 percent or more of its mem-
bers persons who are United States residents, and (2) more than
50 percent of its voting securities are held of record by 300 or more
residents of the United States. 5' The New York regulation of
the internal affairs of foreign corporations also depends upon
greater local contacts. Only if the corporation derives more than
one-half its business income within New York are the provisions'
applicable. 16
Location in Ohio of a foreign corporation's principal place of
business is, however, a highly significant nexus. 6' Furthermore, we
have noted that the Supreme Court now usually avoids the use of
157 These statistics are taken from Reese & Kaufman, supra note 122, at 1119-20.
158The cumulative voting rights have been removed. See note 156 supr.
'
59 See SEC Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1969), reprinted
in 2 CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 26,829, at 20, 102-3. The statement in the text is only
a substantially accurate generalization.
160N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1317-20 (McKinney 1963). Even where the 50 per-
cent test is met, a corporation having a class of stock listed on a national securities ex-
change is exempted.
261 For a discussion of the importance of a corporation's headquarters, one of the
possible meanings of "principal place of business," see Latty, supra note 153, at 166-72;
von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV.
L REV. 1121, 1174 (1966).
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the Constitution to lay down fixed rules of legislative jurisdiction
and choice of law where several jurisdictions have substantial con-
tacts with the transaction.162 Application of the Act to Ohio-based
corporations does not create the most serious type of conflict -
a situation in which the offeror cannot comply with the Act and
the corporations statute of the state of incorporation. The offeror
may obtain certainty by satisfying the Act's requirements. The
conflict may be real, however, as superaddition of the Act denies
the state of incorporation a choice. Furthermore, it can be antici-
pated that the states of incorporation probably will not apply the
Act and that courts in other states will probably be less inclined to
apply the Act in addition to the local blue sky law where the tar-
get is Ohio-based than where the target has an Ohio charter. Ad-
mittedly, lack of uniformity in conflict principles will not create
the most fundamental and damaging type of tensions in the target,
for as the Act now reads damage and rescission actions by share-
holders appear to be the primary enforcement tool: The Act seem-
ingly does not create a remedy of, say, denial of voting rights to
tainted shares which if enforced in Ohio and not enforced in the
state of incorporation could create two competing managements
claiming legitimacy through conflicting judicial decrees. If, how-
ever, the enforcement techniques recommended in part V of this
article were adopted, that would change, for Ohio would, for
example, be asserting a right to exclude tainted shares from the
election process.
Balancing the benefits of uniformity derived from limiting in-
ternal affairs regulation to the state of incorporation against the
palpable interests of a foreign jurisdiction where the corporation
is based is far from a mechanical task. For example, there is a
difficult threshold question on securityholder protection measures
regulating internal matters such as mergers or tender offers.
Should such jurisdiction over a corporation based in the state be
dependent upon ownership of a large percentage, say, 25 percent
or 50 percent of the securities by local residents ?163 Or is a nexus
such as principal place of business or receipt of 50 percent or more
of business income enough to indicate that the corporation is pri-
marily administered or located in the foreign jurisdiction rather
162 See cases cited note 147 supra & accompanying text.
163 These are the percentages employed by California and the SEC, respectively, in
the situations discussed in note 156 & text accompanying notes 156-59 supra. Notice that
the SEC uses a two-fold requirement - a type of principal-place-of-business test plus
a shareholders test - while California uses only the latter.
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than the state of incorporation, with the result that the former's
claims to regulate the various relationships in the corporation's
family group should be considered substantially equal to that of
the chartering state, whose residents may hold only a minute
fraction of the corporation's securities?1 Directly relevant Su-
preme Court authority is lacking, but extrapolations from recent
cases should make anyone cautious in predicting constitutional
invalidation of the Act's coverage of any class of Ohio-based cor-
porations. Coverage of Ohio-based corporations which are pseudo-
foreign is dearly valid and proper. Furthermore, I find no policy
or constitutional ground of sufficient weight to deny a state leg-
islative authority over the internal affairs of a foreign corporation
which has local contacts equaling those Western Air Lines had
with California or which derives 50 percent or more of its busi-
ness income from within the state, especially so long as the regula-
tion does not prevent compliance with the incorporating state's
laws. Coverage of Ohio-based companies having lesser Ohio con-
tacts is, on my scales, a questionable policy, but the constitu-
tional question is another matter. 6 '
10 Professors Reese and Kaufman answer in the negative as to legislation protect-
ing equity securityholders. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 122, at 1133.
165 Ohio receives no help from the established proposition [see note 124 supral
that a state statute may validly impose liability on a shareholder of a foreign corpora-
tion for an act of the corporation in the state. International Harvester Co. v. Depart-
ment of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944), is likewise distinguishable. There, the Wis-
consin tax on dividends paid by foreign and domestic corporations was upheld, even
though the Court assumed that the method chosen constituted the imposition of a
tax upon all shareholders, resident and nonresident, and distributed the tax burden
among classes of stockholders differently than if the tax had been one imposed upon
the corporation. The critical distinction is that the tax was imposed only upon divid-
ends paid out of income derived from property located and business transacted in the
state.
Any serious study of this question should begin with Reese & Kaufman, supra note
122. The authors value most highly the predictability and ease of application obtained
by deference to the law of the state of incorporation and conclude that state statutes
dictating the application of local law to the internal affairs of foreign corporations
"lead in practice to complexities and uncertainties. If they were more common than
they are at present, they would, if rigorously applied, make difficult the efficient
operation of an interstate business by a corporation." Id. at 1144. The authors would
establish a demanding set of criteria to be met before a state having substantial con-
tacts with a foreign corporation could regulate its internal affairs, especially where only
the interests of stockholders are involved and the policies underlying the laws of the
interested states differ. They conclude that even California's assertion of jurisdiction
in Western Air Lines was improper. They note, however, that the extent to which the
full faith and credit clause requires application of the law of the state of incorporation
"is almost entirely unexplored and anything said on the subject must be in the nature
of an opinion." Id. Since the publication of the article in 1958, the Supreme Court
decisions, [note 147 supra] (none of which has related to the internal affairs of corpo-
rations) have continued the trend of refusing to apply constitutional compulsions to limit
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IV. Is AN EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL TAKEOVER
STATUTE DESIRABLE?
Though the federal securities statutes at present specifically
eschew preemption, state legislation such as the Act immediately
raises the issue of whether federal regulation of takeovers should
be exclusive. The takeover acts have an almost unique interstate
impact. Ohio is legislating for the nation in setting global, mini-
mum standards to be satisfied in a takeover bid for Ohio and Ohio-
based companies. In contrast, the remainder of the Ohio Securi-
ties Law limits itself to transactions in Ohio. The regulation of
takeovers, moreover, involves the broadest possible political and
economic considerations, of which securityholder protection is only
one.'6 6 Some of the questions which must be pondered are poten-
tial effects on competition; increases or decreases in the efficiency
of the target; local versus centralized control of our industries;
limits on the debt-equity ratio of an offeror; and the impact on the
management, employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors of the
target. An integrated legislative policy taking all these considera-
tions into account clearly could be fashioned only by Congress.
Furthermore, as recently as 1968 Congress acted on the takeover
issue, deciding to stop with the mild requirements of the Williams
Bill. Lastly, a state takeover act adds a third level of coverage to
preexisting federal and state blue sky legislation and in the proc-
ess creates uncertainties in conflict of laws. Through the com-
merce clause, Congress is able to provide certainty and uniformity
in economic regulation, and as a political body comprised of rep-
resentatives of all regions, it is best situated to balance those needs
against the interests served by local, overlapping regulation. The
Supreme Court has of course followed this philosophy by backing
a plenary congressional power under the commerce clause, while at
the same time expanding the states' authority to impose economic
regulation not forbidden by or inconsistent with federal statutes.
If unhealthy tangles develop among the states, Congress has both
the power and the responsibility to act.
In discussing this issue, it is important, however, to determine
the authority of a state to regulate and to apply its own law when it has substantial con-
tacts and governmental interests.
In determining which state may escheat debts owed by corporations, the Court has
promulgated rigid, easily administered rules. See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674
(1965).
166 See Cary, Corporate Devices Used To Insulate Management From Attack, 25
Bus. LAw. 839 (1970).
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what the questions are. A first vital point is that the Act is a
limited piece of legislation that, as written, should not make take-
over bids impossible. Admittedly, Mr. Vorys has said of the Act:
The real impact of the law, in my opinion, will be felt not so
much in its application as in its hovering omnipresence. I suspect,
so far as Ohio and Ohio-based corporations are concerned, the cor-
porate takeover as a form of corporate warfare is a thing of the
past. Acquisitions will hereafter be negotiated. If management is
unresponsive to the desire of shareholders it will be removed by
proxy contest carried on in the open rather than by the secretly or-
ganized surprise attack which has, up to now, characterized the
takeover bid.167
The Act will discourage prospective takeover offerors, but at this
time I would say only that the Act could mean the extinction of
takeovers for Ohio and Ohio-based corporations. Much will de-
pend upon the Division's administration, which we can assume
will be fair.'68 The attitude of the two courts of appeals which
have rendered decisions on the Williams Bill (both of which have
upheld the offeror) - that substantial compliance rather than per-
fection is to be the test in judging compliance with tender offer
standards phrased in general terms 69 - is of course reassuring
evidence that regulation need not mean strangulation. Turning to
the text of the Act, we have noted that, for a securities bid, the
superaddition of the Act to the Securities Act should not present
the offeror with any major additional timing or disclosure prob-
lems; and the test of grossly unfair terms (or unfair terms) in the
Ohio Securities Law is far from an impossible one to meet. An
offeror placing reasonable efforts into compliance should be able
to dear his offer without much difficulty and without much delay
beyond the waiting period imposed by the Securities Act. The
167 Vorys, supra note 6, at 73.
168 See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 554 (1917), where the Court stated:
The discretion of the commissioner is qualified by his duty, and besides, as we
have seen, the statute gives judicial review of his action. Pending such review,
we must accord to the commissioner a proper sense of duty and the presump-
tion that the functions entrusted to him will be executed in the public in-
terest, not wantonly or arbitrarily to deny a license to or take one away from a
reputable dealer ....
Similarly, the Court in Joseph B. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 46
(1966), observed: "We cannot presume that the authority [the New York State Liquor
Authority] will not exercise that discretion to alleviate any friction that might result
should the ABC Law chafe against the Robinson-Patman Act or any other federal
statute."
16 9 Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., [Current Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 5 92,610, at 98,749 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1970), rev'g [Current Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,473, at 92,233 (W.D. Tex. May 28, 1969); Electronic Specialty
Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
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waiting period will have a more pronounced effect on cash bids.
With the surprise removed, management will no longer be in an
ambush situation and will have the time to counterattack by means
such as attempts to persuade securityholders and actions under
the securities and antitrust statutes. Furthermore, the announce-
ment of the intention to make a bid upon clearance by the Divi-
sion will raise the market price, perhaps even to the figure the
offeror states in its announcement. Whether this will make it im-
probable that the offeror will receive tenders at that price when
the bid opens is unknown, although securityholders presumably
should appreciate that if the bid is unsuccessful the market price
may drop to its prior level.170  But with respect both to cash and
securities bids, the regulatory methods adopted by the Act - wait-
ing period, disclosure, and standards of substantive fairness - are
accepted means of securityholder protection which in other con-
texts have not stilled sales of securities, takeovers by proxy fights,
or capture of control by a tender offer. The Act is a logical exten-
sion of the Williams Bill, the Securities Act, and the SEC's proxy
rules. What the offeror considers a series of impediments are com-
mon techniques employed by the SEC and the states.
I would, therefore, sharply distinguish the Act from defensive
strategems which are not intended to aid shareholders in their de-
cisionmaking process. Two horribles are the private placement
in hands friendly to management of a small class of preferred
stock with a veto power over mergers and a management-requested
loan agreement clause empowering a major lender to accelerate
upon a change in management or control unacceptable to it. It
is one thing to enact legislation necessarily having some discourag-
ing effects upon a potential offeror because securityholders will
have more and better information and be guaranteed that some
standards of substantive fairness will be met and because the wait-
ing period will allow management more time to assert claims un-
der the antitrust, securities, and other statutes. It is quite another
matter when management attempts a harmful alteration of the
corporate structure.171
17 0 For a superb piece on "warehousing" and the role of the arbitrageur in takeover
bids, see O'Boyle, Changing Tactics In Tender Offers, 25 Bus. LAw. 863 (1970).
17 1 For a criticism of these and other tactics, see Cary, supra note 166. Senator
Williams' proposed amendment to the Williams Bill would strengthen the SEC's hands
in this respect. See remarks on S. 3431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), in 116 CoNG.
REc. 1533-34 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1970). From the Senator's description of the amend-
ment, it clearly could be used to prohibit the issuance of the special small class of stock
and the use of the management-inspired acceleration clause. Indeed sections 10(b) and
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The possible divergencies in resolution of conflict of laws
questions do not appear to be significant independent grounds for
preemption. A lack in uniformity by courts in sister states in en-
forcing damage and rescission claims brought by selling security-
holders is, as has been noted, not nearly so harmful as a diversity of
results on, say, the validity of a stock issue. Furthermore, the Act
does not displace the blue sky laws of the various states.
It is also noteworthy that legislation such as the Act does not
merely duplicate the federal statutes. Redundant state regulation
has always appealed to me as a prime candidate for elimination
through preemption. For example, states which in fact do not
pass on the substance of a Securities Act offering should be re-
quired by Congress to do no more than collect a registration fee
upon sales in the state. '72  In a related context, Professor Loss has
demonstrated that the over-the-counter insurance companies and
the state insurance administrators who fought so hard for the in-
surance company exemption from the 1964 amendments to the
Exchange Act won little and created an unnecessary administrative
morass with respect to insurance companies that otherwise would
have been subject to the SEC's reporting, proxy, and insider trad-
ing rules. 173  Since the state administrators are obligated to parallel
the SEC's regulation of other large companies, there is little justi-
fication for the diseconomies and the interpretive problems inherent
in the 50 different schemes of administration. There is one plus:
The state regulation covers many companies too closely held to be
within the SEC's rules.'74
Although the Act is neither a mere duplication of federal se-
curities regulation nor repugnant to it, these conclusions alone do
not tell us that the federal regulation should not be exclusive. If
there were an integrated national policy on takeovers - one that
had been struck after a legislative weighing of all political and
economic ramifications - it would be highly desirable that such a
carefully conceived balance not be altered by state takeover legisla-'
tion. But we have nothing approaching that type of national pol-
14(e) of the Exchange Act can be used for this purpose. See note 97 supra. SEC Ex-
change Act Rule 10b-5 and state law may reach such stratagems. See Crane Co. v. West-
inghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer
Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Ch. 1967).
'
72 Admittedly, preemption on this ground would encounter a major difficulty be-
cause all or almost all state statutes grant the authority to review substantive fairness and
even the mildest administrator sometimes does that
17 3 See 5 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 2741-60 (Supp. 1969).
17 4 See id.
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icy. What we do have is uncertainty about the reach of relevant
existing statutes and strong currents for and against legislative
change.175 For example, the Williams Bill was intentionally
shaped as a delegation to the SEC and the courts almost as exten-
sive as the nearly total entrustment in the regulation of proxy
solicitations. This is an addition to the ever-evolving body of law
under Rule lob-5 and the near-plenary SEC rulemaking authority
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Thus, under existing
law the federal securities regulation of takeovers is developing, in-
complete, and uncertain in its requirements. Senator Williams
has introduced significant (though not fundamental) amendments
to the Williams Bill; and a substantial portion of corporate man-
agers would undoubtedly favor a federal version of the Act, al-
though the securities industry opposition would exceed its intense
fight against the Act.176
During such periods of development and uncertainty about the
proper strength of federal regulation, it seems particularly appro-
priate to allow the states to perform their laboratory function 17
with statutes such as the Act that are logical extensions of the exist-
ing federal standards. I believe Ohio's experiment to be interest-
ing and valuable. Even though the Williams Bill, in light of its
delegations to the SEC and the courts, is not yet a completed prod-
uct and although its provisions on pro rata take-up, withdrawal
rights, and uniformity in price increases were desirable and major
advances over prior law, the paramount truth is that (despite the
dire predictions by the Bill's opponents of possible crippling effects
on offerors) the Williams Bill appears to have had almost no im-
pact on the relative strength of management versus the offeror or
'
7 5 On the ferment concerning the present and the desirable scope of the antitrust
statutes, see Comment, Conglomerates and Section 7: Is Size Enough?, 70 CoLu. L
REV. 337 (1970).
1760 On the attitude of corporate managers, see What Business Thinks, FORTuNE,
Mar. 1970, at 131, 132. The respondents were asked: "Are you in favor of prohibiting
surprise tender offers?" Thirty-nine percent favored, 52 percent opposed, and 9 per-
cent were not sure. 'The strongest support for a ban on surprise tenders was shown by
industrialists and retailers with under $1 billion in sales; 49 percent favor abolishing
the practice." Id. at 132.
On Senator Williams' amendment, see notes 171 supra, 193 infra.
177 Admittedly, the type of experimentation referred to by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his
dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), was "with-
out risk to the rest of the country." Id. at 311. The Act has substantial interstate im-
pact, as internal affairs regulation of corporations with multistate contacts always does.
Nevertheless, although states regulate internal affairs through an extraterritorial statute,
the impact of state takeover statutes is limited to corporations incorporated or based in
the state.
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the former's ability effectively to present its case to shareholders.
Hindsight shows that by choosing to allow the offeror to retain the
advantage of complete surprise, Congress left management in
about the same position it formerly occupied. Given the present
uncertainty on values and the lack of experience with statutes such
as the Act - which takes the next logical step beyond the Wil-
liams Bill, a waiting period and a required comprehensive por-
trait of the offeror and its intentions - a period of observation
is in order.
Should experience show that the Act does in fact prohibit
takeovers and not merely regulate them, congressional nullifica-
tion of statutes such as the Act, at least as to companies of suffi-
dent federal concern to be covered under section 12 of the Exchange
Act, would be warranted - except in the highly unlikely event
that prevention of amalgamation by takeover becomes a congres-
sional aim in the interim. Experience plus a maturation of thought
on takeovers may indicate that the Williams Bill should include
some of the Act's features; in that event, the redundancy principle
would certainly justify partial preemption. Or it may be concluded
that the Williams Bill approach is so dearly correct that state en-
actments such as the Act should not operate where the Williams
Bill is fully applicable. A final possibility must be considered:
Despite the almost unique interstate impact of state legislation
such as the Act, Congress may never arrive at a sufficiently firm
conclusion on the proper regulation of takeovers persuading it
to preempt. That is, of course, the situation in American securi-
ties regulation today. Congress has set the minimum standards but
has always sanctioned state power to set standards which do not
prevent compliance with the federal requirements. This may be
the ultimate outcome on takeover legislation, although the case for
a single national standard for companies registered under section
12 is significantly more compelling than the case for, say, a similar
standard on the offering of new securities. But in any event, the
one dearly unwarranted present action would be a simple con-
gressional ban of state takeover legislation reaching no farther
than the Act.
V. SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT
If, as I believe, it is premature to consider action at the fed-
eral level concerning preemption of the Act, it nevertheless is
timely to consider perfecting amendments to the Act. Opponents
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of the Act would naturally consider repeal the proper amend-
ment, and one believing that takeovers should be stilled could de-
vise amendments to accomplish that. I have limited myself to the
major ones which I believe are needed in perfecting the Act to ac-
complish its stated purposes.
A. Extending the Coverage to Management and Others; Discard-
ing the Hearing Procedure
The Act's expressed goal is to produce fair, full, and effective
disclosure to shareholders in regard to takeover bids. Yet the
Act fails to set standards for management and others attempting
to influence shareholders' decisions concerning acceptance of the
bid. The void is admittedly not so large as it first appears. The
draftsmen undoubtedly were relying upon the federal requirements
under Rule 10b-5 and sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the Exchange
Act. Nevertheless, at least management's responses should be reg-
ulated under the Act. Many of the companies covered by the Act
fall outside the scope of most of the Williams Bill. Also, the
Division's authority to police the fight should reach both major
participants. The minimal disclosure requirements of the SEC's
rules under section 14(d)717 should apply to management, and a
general antifraud standard like section 14(e) should govern both
management and the offeror. In addition, the Division should be
empowered to require management to come forth with material in-
formation possessed by the target relevant to the securityholders'
choice of tendering or retaining the securities. This would in-
dude disclosures about the actual value of assets, current earnings
trends, and amalgamation offers that have recently been rejected
by management.179  Ohio's jurisdiction over management is even
dearer than its jurisdiction over the offeror. Furthermore, if Ohio
has global jurisdiction over an offeror's activities, it probably may
impose the requirements of sections 14(d) and 14(e) on any per-
178 SEC Exchange Act Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-4 (1969), reprinted in 2
CCH FED. SEC. L REP. g 24,284A, at 17,660; SEC Exchange Act Schedule 14D, re-
printed in 2 CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 24,284B, at 17,661-62.
179 Professor Bromberg deals with the questions of how much information manage-
ment should disclose and how far the federal antifraud standards allow it to go in using
projections, plans, and appraisals. A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, §§ 6.3(130), (633).
The possible conflicts with the federal antifraud requirements lead me to recommend
a grant of rulemaking authority to the Division rather than a statutory specification.
If management chooses to fight a tender offer, the federal antifraud standards,
which proscribe half-truths as well as misstatements, will require a considerable amount
of disclosure by management.
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son recommending acceptance or rejection of the offer, even if he
is not an offeror or acting on behalf of management.
The hearing process is also troublesome. As earlier indi-
cated,8 0 it appears that the offeror must stand totally mute and
motionless until approval of its materials by the Division (which
might not issue until 60 days), while management operates under
no Act-imposed restraints. From the offeror's standpoint, the
only advantages of the present structure are that private rights of
enforcement appear to be limited to after-the-fact damage and re-
scission actions by securityholders and that the Division has suffi-
dent lead time so that its approval, once given, will usually mean
that it will not thereafter move to enjoin.' 8' From the standpoint
of the securityholders, allowing materials to be disseminated by only
one side during a period of 20 to 60 days is not calculated to pro-
duce "fair, full, and effective disclosure."
The present procedure could be extended to the materials of
management and anyone else making a recommendation concerning
acceptance. That, however, strikes me as unworkable. Manage-
ment may not have its full reply prepared until dose to the end of
the 20th day after the offeror has filed. Is it to wait a minimum of
20 days after it files before it circulates? Or suppose the Division
orders a hearing on management's materials and not on those of
the offeror: should the offeror be free to proceed while manage-
ment's hands are tied or should the offeror be forced to delay its
offer? Neither alternative would be satisfactory.
Furthermore, there is the question of handling the amend-
ments and supplements of all parties. As the Act now reads, the
offeror and the Division must fashion arrangements for the offeror's
subsequent materials so that the 20- to 60-day delays will be avoided,
as the procedure specified in the Act for the original papers is
patently unworkable for the later materials. This demonstrates
the problems in applying the present procedure to something so
fast-moving as a contested takeover bid, and an extension of the
existing procedure to management and others would compound ex-
isting problems at a geometric rate.
'
80 See text accompanying notes 52, 95-97 supra.
1s1 Under the Williams Bill scheme, which allows concurrent filing, that is not the
case. See Exchange Act § 14(d) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1) (Supp. IV, 1969). In a
securities bid, the Securities Act does of course give the SEC an opportunity for an ad-
vance examination. See Securities Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1964). The proxy rules
usually require nonpublic prefilings a few days before use. See SEC Exchange Act Rule
14a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 a-6 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FBD. SEC. L. REP 5 24,010, at
17,557.
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A waiting period of, say, 30 days after public filing with the
Division and management before the tender offer is actually made
need not be tied to a preclearing or a hearing procedure or even to
a delay in dissemination of the offering documents. Management is
adequately protected against undue surprise if the date on which
the offer formally opens is delayed 30 days after the first public
filing and in the interim the offeror cannot accept conditional or
unconditional tenders or enter into any arrangement binding share-
holders to tender when the offer formally opens. Furthermore,
in a contested takeover bid, it is not necessary to rely upon an ad-
judication or finding by an administrative agency that the statutory
standards have been met. A clear alternative is to follow the proxy
rules and the Williams Bill by relying upon governmental and pri-
vate enforcement (by management and shareholders) in court
actions.
Moreover, I do not believe that an administrative hearing is in-
dispensable. Mr. Vorys has said:
The provision for a hearing was roundly criticized by the opponents
of the bill who argued that the delays occasioned by such hearing
would destroy any takeover bid to which the target company has
not consented.
The proponents asserted that the provision for a hearing is the
only effective means of testing the sufficiency of disclosure prior
to the takeover bid. Once the takeover bid has been made, there
is no effective way to undo it.182
This analysis rings true when a Williams Bill scheme governs, for
filing with the SEC and the target is made the morning the offer is
launched. Where, however, the offeror may only distribute mate-
rials during a 30-day waiting period, there is ample time to resort
to appropriate judicial relief, and management's powers of correc-
tion and persuasion by circulation of its materials can also be ef-
fectively used.
If the suggested approach were adopted, the concept of a defini-
tive Division clearance or adjudication would be dropped, although
a requirement of nonpublic prefiling with the Division, say, 2 days
before use could allow the Division to examine the materials and
a person would be unlikely to proceed in the face of strong objec-
tion. The offeror and management could circulate their views im-
mediately after the prefiling requirement has been met, but the of-
feror could not accept tenders until 30 days after the public
182 Vorys, supra note 6, at 72-73 (1970).
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announcement and filing.183 This change would be accompanied
by a grant of standing to management, shareholders, and the offeror
to obtain injunctive relief against persons violating or about to vio-
late the Act. The Division presently has such standing.'8
The suggested procedure would improve the disclosure process
by allowing management to circulate its materials during the waiting
period and by subjecting management's counterattacks to regulation.
The administrative and enforcement scheme would of course closely
resemble that which exists under the Exchange Act in a proxy con-
test or in a cash takeover bid governed by the Williams Bill, except
that there would be a most meaningful waiting period. Like the
Exchange Act, the Act would rely heavily upon the judiciary, and
the accumulated experience of the federal courts would be a useful
reference in fashioning injunctive remedies. The fact that both
the federal statutes and the Act will apply to a bid and that the
questions under the former will be decided primarily by the judiciary
supplies even further precedent for these proposals. Indeed, the
federal issues and the questions under the Act could often be
joined in a single federal court action.8 5 Another similarity of these
proposals to the federal framework is that the administrative agency
would play a major role. The Act wisely gives the Division rule-
making authority necessary to make the Act responsive to new de-
velopments and to resolve interstitial questions. Furthermore, a 2-
day nonpublic prefiling period would enable the Division to give its
views to management and the offeror in a way calculated to induce
compliance with Division interpretations that do not unreason-
183 Provided that the initial filing substantially complies with the Act, no amend-
ment (other than one increasing the number of shares for which the offer is made)
should extend the 30-day period. The offeror must be free, for example, to reset its
price or exchange ratio.
The Virginia Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541
(Supp. 1968), requires advance filing with the target and the administrator 10 days
before the bid is made. Id. § 13.1-531(a). Shareholders may withdraw tenders at any
time within 21 days from the date of the first invitation to deposit shares. Any
written solidtation or recommendation to shareholders to accept or reject must be
filed with the administrator concurrently with publication and all parties are sub-
ject to an antifraud standard similar to section 14(e). See id. §§ 13.1-532 to -33. It is
unclear whether the offeror may make a recommendation during the 10-day period.
See Comment, Take-Over-Bids in Virginia, 26 WASH. & LEE L REV. 323, 329-30
(1969).
The immediately preceeding paragraph reflects the situation under the Virginia stat-
ute before the April 1970 amendments, which copy or closely follow many of the Act's
central provisions, including the hearing procedure. See 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 55
49, 228-41.
184 CODE § 1707.26 (Page 1964).
185 2 L Loss, supra note 14, at 973-1020; 5 id. 2949-80 (Supp. 1969).
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ably construe or apply the Act and the Division's regulations.
Lastly, the Division's role in court would be quite important. An-
other point is pertinent: It is only because I believe that it is admin-
istratively unworkable to require that materials of all parties be sub-
jected to the present process that I recommend the adjustments in
the Division's role.
Two further amendments suggest themselves. First, to facilitate
the offeror's communication with shareholders, the offeror should
have a right similar to that under Rule 14a-7 in a proxy contest to
force management to mail the offeror's materials at the latter's
expense. 186 This addition would make it more feasible to require
an offeror to make every reasonable effort to communicate the of-
fer to all securityholders.117
Secondly, the Act should impose a sanction for damages upon
management and others if they materially violate the Act. The
sanction would supplement the injunctive remedy already discussed.
As the Act now reads, much is demanded of the offeror and it can
be called to account for failures in damage and rescission actions,
but management and others attempting to influence shareholders'
decisions are untouched by the Act, including civil liabilities under
it. If management and third parties are subjected to antifraud and
disclosure standards, their material violations of the requirements
should create a right for resulting damages. Considerations of ef-
fectiveness of sanctions and fairness vis-i-vis the offeror dictate
this conclusion. This problem is a conceptual thicket, however.
For example, is it management and the target or only the former
who should be liable? Should liability run only to securityholders,
only to the offeror, or to both? What tests of causation are proper
and administrable when a securityholder fails to tender or the of-
feror's bid fails after a counterattack accompanied by false materials
issued by management ?188 The answer may be not to attempt the
independent creation of a standard for damages but rather to adopt
a mirror damages clause for non-offeror violators of the Act:
They will be liable for damages under the Act only if and to the
extent they are liable under federal law. Double recovery would
186 See SEC Exchange Act Rule 14a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1969), reprinted in
2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REt'. 5 24,011, at 17,560; A. BROMBERG, sapra note 14, § 6.3 (130);
Conn. Pub. Act No. 444, § 2 (Jan. Sess. 1969).
187 See text accompanying note 194 infra.
188 For discussion of these or similar issues, see Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [Current
Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 5 92,591, at 98,701 (N.D. 111. Dec. 31, 1969).
THE ROLE OF STATE LEGISLATION
be prohibited. The mirror provision would serve a useful purpose.
Since an offeror may not assert an Exchange Act claim in the state
courts, the incorporation in the Act would sometimes facilitate dis-
position of all issues in one proceeding.18
B. Removal of Exemption for Management-Approved Bids
The total exemption for bids approved by the target's manage-
ment should be deleted. The need for disclosure is substantially
the same whether or not management has been persuaded to rec-
ommend acceptance, and indeed management should be obligated
to spell out the reasons for its agreement.1 0 If, however, manage-
ment has acquiesced, the normal waiting period should be decreased,
for the original documents will be rather complete and the need
that exists in contested bids to allow time for management to pre-
sent its case separately is absent.
C. Revision of the Declaration of Intent Procedure
The declaration of intent procedure is aimed at the 5-percent
holder, or a person who becomes one, acquiring shares through
transactions not constituting a tender offer. 1  By conclusively
presuming that any such person intends to acquire control, the Act
may be on questionable grounds.9 Furthermore, in trading mar-
ket transactions, it is unclear how the disclosure to the seller of
intent to control is to be communicated. A more straightforward
provision would accomplish substantially the same objective: All
record or beneficial owners of 5 percent or more of any class should
file, with the Division and with management, the type of public
reports of securities transactions required by Exchange Act section
13(d),"' but the filing would be made within, say, 3 days rather
18 9 See 2 L. Loss, supra note 14, at 973-1020; 5 id. 2949-80 (Supp. 1969).
Although the Virginia Act regulates the communications of all parties, express
rights of recovery by shareholders are granted only against the offeror and persons
who materially aid the offeror or control it. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-532 to -539 (Supp.
1968). The April 1970 amendments, note 183 supra, did not change these features of
the statute.
190 Cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 432-35- (7th Cir. 1969),
rev'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
19 1 The procedure is discussed in text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
l2 Cf. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). This decision declared the con-
clusive 2-year presumption in contemplation of death cases to be unconstitutionai.
The decision is not one now enjoying high standing, however. See E. GRsWoLD, FED-
ERAL TAXATION 985 (1966).
19 3 Senator Williams has introduced a bill to lower the Williams Bill's trigger
points from 10 percent to 5 percent. See remarks on S. 3431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970), in 116 CoNG. REc 1533 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1970).
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than 10 days as allowed by section 13(d). A material violation
of the reporting obligation could bar the offeror from making a
tender offer within the following year. The reporting duty should
extend only to public companies - those with, say, more than one
hundred securityholders.
D. Uniform Offer to All Securityholders
The provisions favoring Ohio residents should either be de-
leted or replaced with a requirement that a bid for a portion or
all of a class of securities be made ratably to all holders on uni-
form terms. The latter is much more appealing and would repre-
sent a definite advance over the Williams Bill and other state take-
over legislation. An exception for jurisdictions where the offeror,
after reasonable diligence, is unable to comply with the local blue
sky or similar laws would be a necessity.
If a mandatory management-mailing provision similar to Rule
14a-7 were adopted, the requirement of an offering to all share-
holders should include an obligation to make reasonable use of the
mailing channels in disseminating the offering materials. A sub-
stantial waiting period before tenders can be made would tie in nice-
ly with a requirement for an offering to all securityholders through
the mails, as the waiting period can be used to contact nearly all
shareholders by this method.1 4
E. Enforcement of the Act
We have noted some of the possible problems with the Act's
enforcement machinery. The comprehensive Connecticut insur-
ance company statute provides two effective enforcement techniques
which should be adopted. First, shares purchased in violation of
that statute have no voting rights and are not considered out-
standing for voting or quorum purposes. 195 Secondly, a leaf from
the Delaware practice is borrowed: Shares acquired in violation of
the statute are subject to sequestration by a domestic court for
194 On the requirement of an offer to all holders and related possible changes in the
Williams Bill, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 14, at § 6.3 (130). See also N.Y. STOCK
ExcH. Co. MANUAL A-179 (1963).
An earlier version of the Act required the offeror to make the offer to all holders
of the same class and forbade discrimination among holders of the same class of
equity security "by reason of domicile or otherwise." Sub. S.B. No. 138, § (C) (108th
Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. 1969-70).
The Division may have authority to require the bid to be made to all holders on uni-
form terms. See note 152 supra & accompanying text.
19 5 See Conn. Pub. Act No. 444, § 6(a) (Jan. Sess. 1969).
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purposes of enforcing the statute, whether or not the certificates
are in the court's custody or control. 9 '
The long-arm statutes of a few states providing for out-of-state
service of process in actions against nonresident directors 97 suggest
another possibility. Since Ohio is legislating on an internal affairs
principle, a long-arm statute giving Ohio courts jurisdiction over
violations of the Act, wherever and by whomever committed, may
be constitutionally permissible. 9  Such a statute, if valid, would
render academic much of the choice of law discussion in part III
of this article, for Ohio's courts will probably feel compelled to
apply the Act globally 9 9 and prospective plaintiffs seeking dam-
ages or rescission against the offeror would not be slow to ap-
preciate that. This is, of course, simply another illustration of the
importance of long-arm statutes as a consequence of the flexibility
in conflict of laws principles and the pronounced disinclination of
the Supreme Court to impose uniformity through the full faith and
credit or due process clauses, coupled with rather rigid rules under
the full faith and credit clause requiring states to recognize and en-
force judgments of sister states.200
VI. TAKEOvER ACTS As AN IMPETUS
FOR STATE REPORTING, PROXY, AND
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
An interesting possible side effect of the state takeover legisla-
tion may be to focus attention upon the use of legislative power over
internal affairs to impose state versions of the reporting, proxy, and
insider trading provisions of the Exchange Act upon domestic cor-
porations which are public companies (say, one hundred or more
securityholders) but which have fewer than the 500 holders of a
198 See id. § 6(b).
l7 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-11 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10A32-1 (1962);
id. § 12.13-7 (1962) (Supp. 1970). This does not represent the fruits of a search of the
state statutes. My impression is that such provisions are uncommon.
198The Virginia Act creates long-arm jurisdiction over offerors. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-540 (Supp. 1968). The April 1970 amendments, note 183 supra, made no
change in this provision.
The leading current article on long-arm statutes is von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 161. For provisions especially relevant to our question (which must be consid-
ered an open one), see id. at 1159-61, 1173-75.
'
9 9 See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
200 Concerning the freedom of the states to adopt differing conflict principles, see
text accompanying notes 146-47 supra. On the application of the full faith and credit
clause to judgments, see H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CoNrI'cr OF LAws ch. 15
(1964).
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single class required for coverage under those provisions of the Ex-
change Act. The special state provisions concerning insurance
companies enacted as a result of the 1964 amendments to the Ex-
change Act did that to some extent, but the especially stringent
regulation to which insurance companies have always been subject
may have obscured the point that the same standards could theo-
retically be set for any domestic corporation. The takeover acts
illustrate that, given proper motivation, the states will use their
internal affairs powers to supplement the Exchange Act.
The current void in our laws concerning the smaller public
companies is difficult to defend. Such companies, which have
often made a Regulation A,201 or an intrastate20 2 offering, are no
longer closely held; and even if there is no trading market, there
are likely to be numerous securityholders having no close affiliation
with management. 20 3
Although it would be most efficient and would produce the
greatest uniformity if Congress were to lower the inclusion criteria
in the Exchange Act to one hundred holders, there may be good
reasons not to increase the workload of the SEC. The states of
incorporation could fill the void. Historically, of course, while
the states have been active in territorial blue sky legislation, the
corporations statutes have been almost silent on matters such as
public reporting, proxy solicitation, and insider trading regulation.
States have generally vied with each other to produce manage-
ment-oriented internal affairs regulation. We have noted that the
takeover acts, though cast as shareholder protection measures, also
201 SEC Securities Act Rules 251-63, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-63 (1969), reprinted
in 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 55 5742-54, at 5068-78.
202 Securities Act § 3 (a) (11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (11) (1964).
203 This assumes of course that the existing regulation under the Exchange Act
represents sound policy. For a useful volume on the intersection of economic and legal
policies in securities regulation, see ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE SEctuTiEs (H. Manne ed. 1969).
The SEC Special Study's sample of about 1,250 small companies going public for
the first time between 1952-62 shows the need for continuous information. As of Dec.
31, 1962, 8 percent of the companies could not be located and 29 percent were inac-
tive, liquidated, dissolved, or in receivership or reorganization. SEC, REPORT OF
SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcURITIEs MARKETS, H.R. DOC. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt.
1 at 550-52 (1963).
Section 15 (d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (d) (1964), which requires re-
ports of any company which has filed an effective Securities Act registration statement,
acts as only a partial supplement, for companies with fewer than three hundred
holders of the security registered obtain an exemption. In addition, use of Regulation
A [SEC Securities Act Rules 251-63, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-63 (1969), reprinted in 1
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 55 5742-54, at 5068-78) or of the intrastate [Securities Act §
3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1964)] or other exemptions avoids section 15(d).
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serve as management protection devices. The same is true of proxy
regulation, however, in a proxy contest. One of the gaps in the
Act is that a proxy contest accompanied by a few privately nego-
tiated purchases or by purchases in the open market is outside its
scope; and the management of a company not covered by the
SEC's proxy rules (say a company with 450 holders of its common
stock which has not voluntarily registered under Exchange Act
section 12(g)) will probably find itself outside all federal pro-
tections, for Rule 10b-5 is usually inapplicable to a proxy contest
for the election of directors. Management can also benefit from
the reports required under Exchange Act section 16(a).*04, There
may, therefore, be some incentive for the states to reassess their
traditional policy. Furthermore, congressional action on public
companies below the 500-holders category could take the form of
encouraging coverage by the states.205
A movement by the states toward comprehensive reporting,
proxy, and insider trading requirements is probably not a real
possibility, but the precedent is there.
VII. CONCLUSION
My central conclusion is that the Act is an interesting and
useful experiment in state securities and corporations law legisla-
tion. Since it has been adopted in one of the leading industrial
states, it may produce valuable experience about the effect of an
amalgamation of the Securities Act and Williams Bill approaches
upon offerors, management, and securityholders in takeover bids.
Though state statutes such as the Act have almost unique interstate
impact, consideration of federal preemption at this time is pre-
mature. Anything approaching a consensus concerning the proper
regulation of takeovers is lacking and the Act purports to be only a
logical extension of the Williams Bill, the Securities Act, and the
proxy rules. A trial period is indicated. The experience gained
with the state statutes such as the Act coupled with a maturation
of thought should, in a few years, produce a better congressional
decision on a major expansion of the Williams Bill and on preemp-
tion.
204 Exchange Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
2 05 A congressional mandate that a company not subject to specified regulation under
the law of its state of incorporation must xeincorporate under a federal corporations
statute and give up its state charter would produce the necessary state action.
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